| In the 21st century,many companies have realized the importance of social responsibility.This behavior is not only giving back to the society,but also establishing a positive corporate image.At present,domestic corporate social responsibility commitments are unsatisfactory.As a collective decision,even if both the company and the public agree that the company should assume social responsibility,it is still difficult for the company to take collective action due to the lag of social responsibility to generate income and the self-motivated motivation of members of the senior management team.The collective action theory proposes that selective incentives can be used to solve the collective action dilemma,and equity incentives are a common way to motivate executives or other technical personnel to improve their performance.Then can senior management equity gaps be used as selective incentives to solve the dilemma of collective action in socially responsible behavior?Based on the high-level echelon theory,many scholars have explored the relationship between the personal characteristics of managers and corporate social responsibility.In the relationship between the shareholding gap and corporate social responsibility,what role does the collective characteristics of the senior management team play,such as the size and the diversity of the senior management team?Compared with state-owned enterprises,private enterprises have less institutional pressure when choosing whether to assume social responsibility,management team have more power.And it’s necessary for private enterprises to win more government resources through social responsibility.The impact of social responsibility for private corporate is more significant.Based on the research background above,this article takes the private A-share listed companies evaluated by Ranking CSR Ratings(RKS)from 2013 to 2017 as the research object,and adopts the executive shareholding gap,social responsibility and senior management on the basis of relevant theoretical analysis.Data on team characteristics empirically test whether the gap between the shareholding ratio of the CEO and other executives will have an impact on corporate social responsibility,and further analyze the moderating effect of the size and heterogeneity of the executive team.First,this paper explores whether the shareholding gap among executives can be used as a selective incentive to promote corporate social responsibility.Second,it examined whether the size of the senior management team can play a negative moderating role in the relationship between the shareholding gap and corporate social responsibility.In addition,combined with higher-order theory,the paper also explores whether the heterogeneity of the executive team can be used as a moderating variable between the shareholding gap and the corporate social responsibility relationship.The results of the experimental research prove that:(1)The gap between senior management’s shareholding and corporate social responsibility is significantly positively related,which is,the larger the shareholding gap between the CEO and other executives,the better the performance of corporate social responsibility.(2)The scale of the senior management team negatively regulates the relationship between the executive shareholding gap and corporate social responsibility.(3)The heterogeneity of tenure of the senior management team positively regulates the relationship between the senior management shareholding gap and corporate social responsibility,and the heterogeneity of the education level negatively regulates the relationship between the senior management shareholding gap and corporate social responsibility,and the moderating effect of age heterogeneity is not significant.The main contributions of this paper are as follows:(1)Combining the theory of collective action,this paper proposes to use the shareholding gap as a selective incentive to solve the collective decision problem in corporate social responsibility,and provides a reference for the design of equity incentive plans.(2)This paper explores the impact of the size and heterogeneity of the senior management team on the role of selective incentives in the collective decision-making process,and provides ideas for more effective resolution of collective executive action issues. |
