The Governance Of Non-state-owned Shareholder And Dividend Smoothing

Stable cash dividend policy is an important symbol of mature capital market,which helps to protect the interests of shareholders and promote the stable and healthy development of listed companies.But the dividend payment of Chinese listed companies has zero dividend payments,abnormal high-cash payments,fluctuating dividend payments and other visions.Therefore,regulators developed some policies to relate refinancing conditions with the level of dividend distribution,guiding listed companies to establish a sustainable and stable dividend distribution policy.But it fails to bring the dividend smoothing into the supervision and governance system of the company.The research of scholars shows that a good governance environment is conducive to maintaining the dividend smoothing.However,the state-owned enterprises in China have some defects,such as "one dominant share","absence of owners" and "insider control",which hinder the efficient establishment and operation of modern corporate governance system.The starting point of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is to establish a good corporate governance structure,by introducing non-state shareholders to supervise and restrain the self-interested behaviors of the management and controlling shareholders so as to improve the efficiency of corporate governance.Specially,the non-state-owned shareholders can better implement their supervisory functions by successfully appointing directors to participate in corporate governance.Therefore,in-depth discussion of the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders on the dividend smoothing is helpful for us to understand the impact of corporate governance efficiency on dividend smoothing,and to test the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders from the perspective of dividend smoothing.Based on the institutional background of state-owned enterprise classification reform,this paper adopts normative and empirical research methods,and explore the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders from the perspective of dividend smoothing,taking the state-controlled listed companies from 2009 to 2017 as research samples.Firstly,considering the influence of internal mechanism,this paper analyzes the relationship between the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and dividend smoothing from ownership structure and high-level governance structure.Secondly,this paper considers the impact of product market competition,an external governance mechanism,on the above relationship.Finally,this paper further analyzes whether non-state-owned shareholders have different governance effects on dividend smoothing under different administrative levels.The results show that:(1)the higher the shareholding ratio of non-state-owned shareholders,the stronger the dividend smoothing;(2)the higher the proportion of directors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders,the stronger the dividend smoothing;(3)the degree of competition in the external product market will weaken the positive correlation between the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and dividend smoothing;(4)the positive correlation between governance of non-state-owned shareholders and dividend smoothing is significant in local soes,but not significant in central soes.Based on the research conclusions,this paper puts forward the following policy suggestions:(1)deepen the reform of mixed ownership,and ensure the full play of the governance function of non-state-owned shareholders;(2)implement the state-owned enterprise classification reform,and attach importance to the principle of"competition neutrality";(3)collaborate regulation with governance,and promote the stability of dividends.