| As one of the important means of corporate governance,the equity incentive plan can enhance the enthusiasm of the company's senior executives,and encourage the senior executives to strive to complete the company's performance,increase the company's economic interests,enhance the company's competitiveness,and increase Corporate value is a win-win situation for shareholders and management.On the other hand,the formulation of the equity incentive plan may also become a breeding ground for executive opportunism.In order to obtain equity incentives,executives can achieve the performance targets of performance evaluation in the equity incentive plan by smoothing performance or false reporting of performance,which will make the company report unreliable performance,affect the normal operation of the company,and mislead investors.The value of the assessment of the business leads to economic disorder.Different from the US equity incentive plan,the implementation of China's equity incentive plan not only requires the management to provide corresponding services and meet the service term conditions,but also needs to complete the performance goals set out in the equity incentive plan during the business process.It shows that most of the equity incentive plans of Chinese A-share listed companies are performance-based equity incentive plans.Due to the non-deferrability of China's equity incentives,the equity incentives granted after performance evaluation cannot be deferred to the later stage.If the incentives are not unlocked or exercised,listed companies must repurchase or cancel the incentive targets.To maximize the gains that can be made,managers may choose to manipulate actual reported performance to achieve the performance targets set by the equity incentive plan.The results of empirical research show that listed companies that formulate performance-based equity incentive plans will manipulate their performance to a certain extent,so that the reported performance is close to the predetermined performance target,that is,the performance "step on the line" phenomenon,thereby completing the equity incentive plan and obtaining corresponding equity excitation.Research on the role of equity incentives There are many researches at home and abroad.Equity incentive scholars have a lot of research on them.There have been many in-depth studies on the impact of equity incentives on companies,and they have obtained relatively rich research results.Most of the research results focus on the role of equity incentives for enterprises,but few scholars have studied the impact of equity incentive plan performance conditions on managerial behavior during the implementation of equity incentives,and no research has focused on the implementation of equity incentive plans.The relationship between performance conditions,reporting performance,and corporate earnings management behavior is explained.This paper summarizes the predecessors' research on American company methods,and uses the data of China's A-share listed companies to start from the distribution of reported results,and test whether the reported results of China's A-share listed companies are concentrated in the performance targets of equity incentives and provide reasonable results for reporting performance aggregation.explanation of.In order to provide sufficient evidence for studying the implementation characteristics of equity incentives of listed companies in China's A-share market,the social significance of this paper is of certain importance.The article is divided into seven parts,the content is arranged as follows:The first chapter is the introduction,introducing the research background,research significance,research ideas and framework of this article and the innovation of this paper.The second chapter is the literature review.It mainly sorts out the theory of equity incentives and the theory of performance aggregation based on relevant logic.The theory of equity incentives mainly introduces the relationship between equity incentive plan and performance.The third chapter introduces the Chinese equity incentive plan,and introduces the design principle and design content of the listed company's equity incentive plan by introducing the contents of the listed company's equity incentive plan and the index design.Through fact cases to understand the specific classification of equity incentive plans for listed companies in China.The fourth chapter introduces the model and method of this paper.This paper mainly tests the performance aggregation phenomenon according to Bennett's method,and uses McCrary's method for breakpoint regression to test whether the actual report performance is discontinuous at the performance target.Second,use the Bollen and Pool methods to detect whether there are other breakpoints in the relative performance distribution.Finally,the Bootstrapping method is used to detect the breakpoint size.The fifth chapter is the analysis of the empirical results.By collecting the contents of the equity incentive plan and the financial statement data from January 1,2006 to December 31,2016,the first is to test whether the performance is gathered at the performance target.Determine whether the performance of the report is not continuous at the performance target,ie,a breakpoint is generated at the performance target.The sixth chapter is the analysis of the reasons for the performance aggregation,and the traditional interpretation of the performance aggregation phenomenon,that is,the target ratchet effect.The seventh chapter is the conclusion,summarizing the full text,providing constructive suggestions for the significant empirical results,and expounding the areas that can be improved.Through empirical research,the following conclusions are found:(1)China A-share market companies have actual performance results close to the performance targets in equity incentive performance evaluation,so that the number of enterprises falling to the right of the performance target group is significantly more than the left side of the enterprise target.The number of companies in the group,resulting in agglomeration of performance.(2)In the Chinese A-share market,there is only a performance target,which is only a performance target.There are no other performance gathering points,which proves that a large number of companies will report the performance close to the performance target,rather than gathering elsewhere.(3)China's A-share market performance has a clustering effect,which is caused by the target ratchet effect,that is,the actual report performance in the previous period will affect the performance target setting of the next period,and the enterprises that are close to the performance target in this period will also complete the performance target in the next period.(4)The executive performance of executives in China's A-share market is continuous.If the corresponding indicators are manipulated in the current period,the indicator will be manipulated in the next period.The contributions of this paper are as follows:(1)This paper is an empirical test of the Chinese market data in combination with the Bennet method.Through Bennett's method combined with the specific data of the equity incentive plan of listed companies in China's A-share market,we can find out the characteristics of equity incentives in China's A-share market.(2)This paper analyzes the motives of the equity incentive plan for the managers of listed companies in China's A-share market.By understanding the implementation of the equity incentive plan in China's A-share market,it analyzes the behavior of the company's formulation,implementation and reporting.Use the data to understand whether the company is performing smooth performance or fictitious performance during the incentive period.To a certain extent,in order to promote the equity regulation plan to be more standardized and more scientific,it seeks the performance characteristics in the implementation process of China's equity incentive plan.(3)This paper provides policy recommendations for the formulation,implementation and supervision of the equity incentive plan of China A-share market companies,better promotes the formulation,implementation and supervision of equity incentive plans,and provides policy support for the improvement of equity incentive plans.The shortcomings of the paper are as follows:Since China is still in the initial stage of the formulation of the equity incentive plan,the listed company's equity incentive plan has a shorter development cycle,and the goal of the unified equity incentive plan cannot be fully reflected,which affects the research conclusion to some extent such as Robustness and generality. |
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