Research On The Impact Of Accounting Independent Directors’ Reputation On Enterprise Real Earnings Management

In China’s capital market,corporate earnings management has always been the focus of academic and practical research.In recent years,with the strengthening of external supervision,the company’s earnings management has gradually changed from accrued earnings management to real earnings management.The practice of each country begins with the root cause of earnings management namely information asymmetry,and introduces an independent director system in modern corporate governance.The "Opinions" issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulates that an independent director of an accounting profession must be set up among independent directors of listed companies.This shows that the accounting professional independent director with professional advantages plays an important role in the governance mechanism of listed companies.However,there are relatively few studies on independent directors in accounting professions.Therefore,it is very valuable to explore the impact of independent accounting professionals on the real earnings management of enterprises.At the same time,from the previous research,the salary mechanism,market mechanism and legal mechanism can not effectively encourage independent directors at this stage in China.This paper attempts to explore the role of independent directors in accounting profession from the perspective of reputation mechanism.This paper focuses on the impact of independent accounting professionals on the real earnings management of enterprises,and further joins the CEO power factor to examine whether the CEO’s power will weaken the governance effect of the independent director of high reputation accounting profession.This paper takes the reputation of the independent director of accounting profession as the research object and uses the research methods of literature research,induction and deductive methods to analyze the root causes of the real earnings management behavior of enterprises through principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and earnings management theory.The director reputation theory,the corporate governance structure theory and the management power theory analyze the governance role of the accounting profession’s independent director’s reputation on the company’s real earnings management behavior and the restraining effect of the CEO’s power.Subsequently,this paper takes the 2013-2017 Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company as a research sample,and uses the empirical accounting research method of archive research method to propose and test the research hypothesis of this paper,and draws the following two conclusions:(1)Accounting major The higher the reputation of independent directors,the stronger the governance effect on real earnings management of enterprises;compared with college scholars,the high-prestige accounting professional directors of the firm’s auditors have more obvious effects on the management of real earnings management;(2)The CEO’s power will inhibit the governance effect of the independent accounting professional on the real earnings management of the enterprise.The conclusions of this paper enrich the literature on independent directors and management power,and provide a path reference for corporate real earnings management governance.This paper proposes countermeasures for managing real earnings management of enterprises from two aspects:(1)improving the reputation of the independent accounting professional to improve its governance role;(2)rationally configuring the CEO’s power to prevent its inhibition.