Analysts Coverage,Managerial Risk Preference And Financing Efficiency Of Listed Companies

The efficiency of corporate financing determines the vitality of the daily operation as well as long-term sustainable development of the companies.The level of financing efficiency of companies is influenced by the market efficiency at the macro level and also the effect of corporate governance as well as management decision at the micro level.The separation of ownership and management improves the efficiency of the company,but it also leads to the problem of Information asymmetry between shareholders and management and the agency cost.The managers' risk preference psychology will distort their capital management as well as investment and financing decisions,thus reducing the company's financing efficiency,resulting in the loss of the company's value,the agency costs between owners and management are exacerbated by Information asymmetry within the company.In China,where the corporate governance system is not perfect,when the managers' decision-making deviates from the objectives of the profit maximization,or when they take opportunistic actions motivated by self-interest,the risk-taking of the company is intensified,it is often difficult for shareholders to effectively detect and monitor the behaviour of management.Securities Analysts in the market act as information intermediaries between listed companies and market investors to track and mine companies' financial performance as well as business dynamics,the analysts' tracking and attention behavior can play an external governance effect of supervising the management's behavior and reducing the agency cost.This paper attempts to study the effect of management's risk preference on financing efficiency of listed companies,and further introduces analysts' attention as an external information intermediary mechanism as a moderating variable,this paper explores the impact of analysts' attention on the relationship between managers' risk preference and corporate financing efficiency.Therefore,this paper takes 2013-2018 as the inspection period,selects the financial data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets and the related data about the analysts attention as the research sample,through the theoretical analysis and the empirical research,the conclusions are as follows:(1)there is a significant negative correlation between managerial risk preference and corporate financing efficiency.That is,the stronger the risk preference of management,the lower the financing efficiency of the company;(2)analysts coverage cansignificantly inhibit the negative impact of managerial risk perference on financing efficiency.That is,the higher the degree of analyst's coverage,the smaller the negative impact of managerial risk preference on the financing efficiency of enterprises;(3)compared with state-owned enterprises,The inhibitory effect of analysts coverage on the relationship between managerial risk preference and financing efficiency is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises;(4)the moderating effect of analysts coverage on the relationship between managerial risk preference and financing efficiency of listed companies has significant differences in different industries.The research significance of this paper is as follows:(1)it enriches the related research on the influencing factors of listed companies' financing efficiency and expands the related research on the economic consequences of analysts coverage as well as managerial risk preference;(2)it can help the shareholders of the listed company to strengthen the supervision of the managers by paying more attention to the external independent information disclosure institution,so that they can reduce the agency cost of the enterprise,optimize the internal governance of the company,and also perfect the mechanism of the supervision by the management;(3)it is helpful for listed companies to establish a more perfect system of senior management appointment by strengthening the screening of the heterogeneity of the risk preference characteristics of managers;(4)to help financial market to place greater emphasis on the role of security analysts in monitoring corporate governance and protecting investors' rights and interests,and to make the best use of the advantages of analysts to promote the formation of a compliant and efficient capital market.