Managerial Risk Preference、Analyst Coverage And Earnings Management

In recent years,accounting fraud,financial fraud and other phenomena seriously damage the quality of accounting information,earnings management problems are widespread in listed companies,which not only damage the economic interests of investors,but also seriously affect the smooth operation of the capital market.Management plays the role of "leader" in creating and reporting accounting information,which provides the conditions for earnings management of enterprise management.Different managements have different attitudes towards risks.In order to cover the earnings fluctuations caused by their risk appetite,the managements choose different earnings management methods to adjust the corporate performance.By virtue of their own attention to the enterprise,securities analysts effectively play their role of external supervision.In view of this,this paper,on the basis of relevant literature review,combined with principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,signal transmission theory and prospect theory,sorted out and analyzed the relationship between management risk preference,analyst attention and corporate earnings management.Then,taking the data of a-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as the research sample,factor analysis,correlation analysis,regression analysis and other methods were used.This paper explores the direct and moderating effects of the risk preference of the management,the attention of analysts and the earnings management of listed companies.Results:(1)the risk preference of management is positively correlated with accrual earnings management,negatively correlated with real earnings management,and positively correlated with non-current profit and loss earnings management;(2)there is an inverted "U" type relationship between analyst attention and accrual earnings management,a positive "U" type relationship with real earnings management,and a negative correlation with non-recurring profit and loss earnings management.(3)the attention of analysts can have a moderating effect on the risk appetite,accrual earnings management and real earnings management of the management.(4)analysts’ attention has no significant moderating effect on the relationship between risk preference of management and non-recurring profit and loss earnings management.Finally,based on the empirical conclusion,this paper proposes to optimize the management team construction and improve the management layer risk awareness.Improve the construction of analyst quality,reasonable construction of analyst team;Strengthen the legal construction,promote the orderly development of the market and other countermeasures.