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Analysts Coverage,Nature Of Property Right And Earnings Management Behavior Choices

Posted on:2020-05-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J Y LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330614465196Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
There are principal-agent problems and information asymmetry between managers and investors,which make managers have the motivation of earnings management.And securities analyst with the professional knowledge of quality and ability,analysts pay attention to how to affect the enterprise earnings management behavior has caused the attention of the scholars in this paper,based on analysts monitor hypothesis and pressure hypothesis theory,combining normative research and empirical research method,discusses the analyst coverage for corporate earnings management behavior choice,and further thinking about the nature of the property.In this paper,the a-share listed companies in Shanghai and shenzhen in 2013 and 2017 were taken as research samples,and the following conclusions were obtained: based on the influence of supervision effect and pressure effect,analysts' coverage will reduce the accrued earnings management behavior of enterprises;But will increase the enterprise's real earnings management behavior;after considering the property right nature,it is found that the inhibition effect of analysts' coverage on accrual earnings management behavior of non-state-owned enterprises is stronger;The promotion effect on the real earnings management behavior of state-owned enterprises is stronger.This paper puts forward the following Suggestions:Since analysts' coverage enhances the motivation of enterprises' real earnings management,relevant regulatory departments should improve the information disclosure mechanism of enterprises and the incentive mechanism of analysts to improve the supervision of enterprises' real earnings behavior;The multi-polar target and lack of ownership of state-owned enterprises encourage them to conduct real earnings management,The government should reduce administrative intervention and optimize the promotion and assessment mechanism of senior executives of state-owned enterprises to reduce the motivation of real earnings management of state-owned enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:Analyst Coverage, Nature of Property Right, Earnings Management
PDF Full Text Request
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