Research On Audit Judgment Of Government Investment Projects Based On Information Asymmetry

Government investment projects play an important role in China’s economic development.Among them,the majority of urban infrastructure projects have the characteristics of long project construction cycle and large capital demand,which drive the rapid and steady development of China’s economy.The rapid development of China’s economy reflects the large increase in the number of government-invested projects,which brings new challenges to the current auditing mode in China,and naturally brings new breakthroughs for auditors.Government investment project audit judgment,to some extent ensures the rational use of government money,is to improve the way of government project audit quality should not be neglected,There is information asymmetry between the two parties participating in the audit,which affects the auditor’s audit judgment in the audit process.In other words,auditing exists to resolve information asymmetry.Audit judgment is a game process between the two parties involved in the audit.There is information asymmetry in the audit judgment of government investment projects.The participating units are limited rational economic persons in market transactions.There are two opposites of information advantages and disadvantages.The uncertainty of this information makes the accuracy and authenticity of the audit judgment impossible.The quality of the audit is also affected,which is contrary to the original intention of the audit.The essence of audit judgment is a "dynamic game of incomplete information",which is completely consistent with the information asymmetry in the audit process of government investment projects,which lays a theoretical foundation for the thesis to use game theory to solve the problem of audit judgment.The audit judgments are different in different stages of the project,and the collusion between the participants is different.This article aims at one of them to establish a game model.The decision-making design stage is to collaborate with the design and audit units and form a threeparty game with the construction unit.The three parties of supervision and construction colluded to form an interest group,and the audit unit formed a four-party game.At the completion settlement stage,the construction and audit unit colluded with each other,and the construction unit formed a three-party game to obtain the optimal solution to the decisionmaking equilibrium of all parties in the game,and analyze the impact of each The influencing factors of participating in game decision-making behaviors,by destroying the factors that affect the behavioral decision-making,undermine the conditions for the success of the collusion between the two parties or the three parties,increase the difficulty of the collusion success,inhibit the occurrence of the collusion behavior,prevent the loss of government project funds,and damage national interests.The established model is verified in combination with actual cases.The results show that game theory can solve the problem of information asymmetry in the audit judgment of government investment projects.From the external and internal factors that affect audit judgment,it can be refined to national policies,Industry regulations,audit personnel’s own quality and code of conduct and other optimization measures are proposed to achieve the purpose of improving audit quality,as far as possible to protect the interests of all parties and ensure the rational use of national resources.