Analysis Of Government Procurement Problems And The Regulatory Countermeasures Of The A District Of S City

In April 2009,the general office of the State Council issued the opinions on Further Strengthening the management of government procurement,which requires further strengthening the mechanism construction of separation of supervision and implementation of government procurement.In October 2015,according to the instructions and requirements of the people's Government of district A of city S,the government affairs service center of district A of city S undertook the function of government procurement and realized the separation of government procurement supervision;the platform has been stable since its operation,the relevant government procurement transaction supervision system has been continuously established and improved;the original government procurement electronic platform,information management system,file assessment system and other information platforms are integrated into a unified government procurement supervision and trading platform,forming a relatively perfect government procurement supervision system.Ilowever,in recent years,conspiracy cases in the field of government procurement in district A still occur from time to time.Therefore,it is necessary for us to comprehensively and systematically analyze the existing problems,causes and management methods and Preventive Countermeasures of government procurement in district A,effetivcly restrain all kinds of problems in government procurement.From the conspiracy cases in the field of government procurement in district A of city S in recent years,we can find that the means of power rent-seeking is constantly upgrading,conspiracy extends continuously from the implementation stage of government procurement activities,and it is difficult to find illegal behaviors in the bid opening and evaluation site.In the past,it is difficult to deal with it only by using a single theoretical research,because the use of principal-agent,prevention of collusion and incentive regulation to analyze and find countermeasures.In this paper,according to the problems of four types of procurement parties,and related cases to prove,through the use of principal-agent,conspiracy theory to explore the causes of one by one,and combined with the above theory and incentive regulation,put forward preventive countermeasures and suggestions,and draw the following conclusion:Firstly,government procurement needs to entrust professional agent because it involves a wide range of fields and strong professionalism.The principal-agent here mainly refers to that the purchaser entrusts the bidding agency to organize the government procurement procedure and the purchaser entrusts the supplier to provide the public goods and services needed by the government and the public.Because of the information asymmetry,the agent has a comparative advantage.At the same time,in the principal-agent relationship,the interests of the principal and the agent are contrary,and the principal can not supervise the agent and know the agent's efforts.Therefore,adverse selection and moral hazard arise.In order to obtain unlimited benefits,agents may initiate collusion to hunt government procurement projects.In this regard,one is to reduce the agent's comparative advantage through information symmetry;the other is to strengthen the acceptance publicity and performance evaluation of government procurement activities,and evaluate the agent's efforts in the entrustment agreement.Secondly,the emergence of collusion is bound to be accompanied by the existence of large enough surplus profits in government procurement,and the main body of collusion is willing to take great risks to obtain it,the surplus profit is easy to be hidden,so that the regulatory authorities and other participants are not easy to detect;in collusion,one party has great power to control the profit distribution.So the prevention of collusion is mainly solved in three ways:The first is to reduce the benefits available to all parties involved in collusion,adjust or modify the contract between the principal and the agent,such as increasing the transfer payment mode,increasing the supervision link,increasing the transaction cost and reducing the collusion income;the second is to divide the power of collusion participants with absolute dominant power.For example,different decision makers should control each other through checks and balances;the third is to introduce the supervision party to improve the accuracy of the principal's grasp of the agent's information,and constantly weaken the agency's comparative advantage.Thirdly,the introduction of the supervision parly can improve the accuracy of the agent's information and weaken the agency's comparative advantage.By analyzing the game tendency and optimal choice of both sides,the best solution is found.First,in the principal-agent relationship,when the principal maximizes the benefits,it should be in line with the maximization of the agent's interests.In this way,the constraint on the agent can be realized through incentive compatibility,such as giving the agent a long-term contract;the second is to fully consider the profit margin of suppliers;third,strengthen the supervision of principals and agents to reduce moral hazard.The parties concerned in the procurement are unwilling to give up collusion and maintain the long-term contractual relationship because of the rich and stable remuneration in the end.To sum up,this paper analyzes the problems of four types of parties in government procurement activities one by one by using the three theories of principal-agent,collusion and prevention of collusion and incentive regulation,and finally puts forward regulatory countermeasures.The research is innovative and has strong operability for the supervision and management practice of government procurement activities.