Research On The Impact Of Collusion Between Major Shareholders And Managers On The Efficiency Of Financial Resources Allocation In Chinese Listed Companies

Financial resources are the capital funds originally invested by the enterprise and the profits and various capital assets gradually accumulated in the production and operation process.The particularity and scarcity of financial resources determine the allocative efficiency,which directly affects the overall benefit and efficiency of enterprises.No matter when financial resource allocation activities such as determining the optimal capital institution,achieving an effective investment portfolio,and operating distribution are all carried out in specific corporate governance.Major shareholders and managers as owners and operators of modern enterprises,there is no doubt that the distribution of control rights,principal-agent relationship,supervision and collusion between them as the most important contents of the corporate governance mechanism,which will have an important impact on the efficiency of enterprise financial resource allocation.Since the implementation of the share-trading reform in 2005,China's share reform has made remarkable achievements.However,compared with the United States,Britain and other highly developed capitalist countries,the ownership structure of listed companies in China is still relatively concentrated.In 2017,the proportion of the largest shareholder holding more than 50% accounted for 13.32%,and the proportion of the largest shareholder holding more than 33.33% accounted for 42.96%.The concentration of equity and the lack of effective legal protection mechanisms for small and medium-sized investors lead to large shareholders often have ownership and considerable control,and the managers have some residual control rights and business management rights.Due to self-interested orientation and opportunism,coupled with information asymmetry,it is possible for major shareholders and managers to carry out capital occupation,unfair connected transactions,insider trading,and large on-the-job consumption through their actual control rights and internal information advantages,which not only seriously affected the effective allocation of financial resources and the improvement of business performance,but also deepened the conflict with minority shareholders and hindered the normal operation of the capital market order in China.Different from the traditional double principal-agent conflict research,this paper takes the continuous infringement incidents in China's capital market as the starting point,and takes the large shareholder-management collusion as the motivation.Based on the principal-agent theory,collusion theory and financial resource allocation theory,this paper discusses the impact of the collusive behavior between large shareholders and managers on the allocation efficiency of corporate financial resources,in order to explain how to determine the optimal allocation pattern of control rights and maximize the allocation efficiency of corporate financial resources.The results show that: First,the impact of major shareholder-managers collusion on the efficiency of financial resource allocation of enterprises is as high as 24.3%.The comprehensive power of major shareholder-managers,the occupation of large shareholders,the managers of on-the-job consumption,and the free cash flow of enterprises,which have a negative impact on the efficiency of corporate financial resource allocation,while equity balance has a positive impact with the efficiency of corporate financial resource allocation.Second,from 2016 to 2017,the score of financial efficiency has changed from negative to positive,indicating the overall efficiency of resource allocation has undergone a qualitative change.Third,restraining the collusive behavior of major shareholders-managers in practice is an important measure to improve the efficiency of financial resource allocation.