Mixed Ownership Structure,executive Pay Gap And Enterprise Performance

Finance plays a central role in the modern economic development,and provides the support for the development of entity economy.Mixed ownership reform is one of the hot issues that is concerned and studied by domestic and foreign scholars in the academic circles.With the development of mixed ownership structure,the reform of internal executive compensation system has become one of the key issues of enterprise reform.At present,there is a large amount of literature on mixed ownership structure reform,but few scholars specialize in the reform of mixed ownership structure of the financial industry,especially studying on the relationship between mixed ownership structure,compensation difference of the top management team and enterprise performance that is in the financial industry.In this context,the author does a theoretical analysis and makes an empirical study that is specialize in the relationship between the mixed ownership structure,executive pay gap and enterprise performance of listed companies that is in financial industry,which not only can improve the theories of mixed ownership structure and executive compensation,but also provides theoretical basis and empirical support for the reform of mixed ownership structure in the financial sector and the further improvement of executive compensation system.Based on annual report data from 2011 to 2018 of 39 listed firms from the financial sector in China as samples,by theoretical analysis,this thesis explores the relationship between mixed ownership structure,executive pay gap and enterprise performance,and explores the path that executive pay gap of the financial industry makes an influence on enterprise performance when the company is under different equity concentration or under different degree of equity balance.Then this thesis builds a performance evaluation model and regression analysis model,and makes a series of empirical tests to reach the relationship in financial industry between mixed ownership structure,executive pay gap and enterprise performance.In order to make the regression result more stable and reliable,this thesis makes some robustness tests,including in adopting instrumental variables to alleviate the endogenous problem and adopting variable substitution method for robustness test.The empirical results show that:(1)under certain conditions,the executive pay gap of listed financial companies is negatively correlated with enterprise performance.In other words,the more obvious the difference in executive compensation,the lower the enterprise performance,and this negative correlation exists in the current period and the lagging period;(2)under certain conditions,the equity concentration of listed companies in the financial industry has a negative regulating effect on the relationship that is between the executive pay gap and enterprise performance.But the results were not significant either in the current period or in the lag period.(3)under certain conditions,the degree of equity balance in listed financial companies has a negative regulating effect on the relationship that is between executive pay gap and enterprise performance.In other word,in lower degree of equity balance companies,the difference of executive compensation has a more obvious effect on enterprise performance.And this kind of negative adjustment effect exists in current period and lag period.Finally,according to the theoretical analysis and empirical research results,this thesis puts forward some corresponding suggestions.