Research On The Relationship Between Executives Overconfidence And Stock Price Synchronization

Stock price synchronization is one of the important indicators to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of capital market information.Compared with relatively mature Western securities markets such as Europe and the United States,China’s stock price synchronization is relatively high,which has hidden hidden troubles such as stock price collapse in the financial market.The high stock price synchronization is also not conducive to the long-term development of the capital market and the national economy.Executives,as corporate managers and decision-making core,are closely related to fluctuations in the stock prices of listed companies.In reality,executives appear as heterogeneous subjects with multiple cognitive biases.Does their overconfidence affect the synchronicity of listed companies’ stock prices? In addition,the synchronization of stock prices is the embodiment of the company’s characteristic information and transparency.Radical earnings management leads to the distortion of the company’s characteristic information,and the executives driven by overconfidence have a high degree of motivation for earnings management.Does it play an intermediary role between overconfidence and stock price synchronization? From the perspective of corporate governance,it is also worth investigating whether the supervisory role of independent directors with financial and accounting backgrounds is equally applicable to regulating the irrational behavior of executives.Based on this,this article puts executive self-confidence and stock price synchronization into the same research framework,and further explores the intermediary mechanism of earnings management and the regulatory mechanism of independent directors with financial and accounting backgrounds.This article is mainly based on the "information efficiency view" hypothesis and behavioral finance theories,comprehensively using theoretical analysis and empirical research methods,taking the stock synchronization of Chinese A-share listed companies from2013 to 2018 as the research object,and using multiple regression models for empirical Research,and on the basis of carrying out a number of robustness tests,finally reached the conclusion of the study and put forward relevant recommendations.The main research conclusions are as follows: first,in the verification of main effects,it is found that the overconfidence of executives will significantly improve the synchronization of the stock prices of listed companies;Stock price synchronization,part of the intermediary role of "earnings management" has been confirmed;third,in the adjustment effect verification,independent directors with accounting background can negatively adjust the positive impact of executives’ overconfidence on earnings management,that is,listed companies The higherthe proportion of independent directors in the background,the weaker the positive impact of overconfidence of executives on earnings management;further verification found that independent directors with a financial and accounting background negatively regulate the excessive mediators ’influence of executives through earnings management.Independent directors with accounting background have a regulatory effect on the intermediary mechanism,and there is a “moderated mediation”.When the proportion of independent directors with financial background in listed companies is higher,the more intermediary effects of executives through earnings management on stock price synchronization weak.The results of this paper reveal the correlation between executives ’overconfidence psychology and stock price synchronization fluctuations,and propose a possible transmission path between the two,which theoretically enriches the discussion of behavioral company finance and stock price synchronization.In operation,it can provide certain empirical evidence for standardizing the governance of listed companies and optimizing the design of regulatory systems.