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Research On Incentive Mechanism Of SaaS Cloud Outsourcing Under Dual Information Asymmetry

Posted on:2021-03-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q C WuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330614959889Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the continuous development and maturity of cloud computing in the Internet era,the IT cloud outsourcing model represented by SaaS has gradually become a new way for enterprises to promote information construction.Enterprises can obtain hardware and software services directly from SaaS service providers over the Internet.However,in the process of cooperation between enterprises and SaaS cloud service providers,there exist information asymmetry problems,they are adverse selection and moral hazard problems,those problems result in the enterprise requirements of service quality can not be guaranteed and cause heavy losses to enterprises.Therefore,it is worth studying to design a reasonable contract to obtain the private information of cloud service providers,and to motivate them to make the best efforts to reduce risks in the process of cooperation.Based on the contract design of SaaS cloud service provider by enterprises,this paper makes the following research.First,considering SaaS hardware and software services,this paper constructs a single-stage and multi-task principal-agent model considering SaaS hardware service and software service,using the reverse induction method to solve the single-stage game equilibrium.This paper analyzes effects of the cost coefficient in hardware and software services,risk aversion degree,the proportion of different types of service providers and the variance of random factors to cloud service providers’ effort in the process of cloud outsourcing.This paper makes out the optimal incentive parameters and verifies the reasonable validity using the numerical experiment Secondly,this paper further expands the static contract into dynamic contract,constructing a two-stage,multi-task principal-agent model,to solve the twostage dynamic game equilibrium results,and analyzes how the private information obtained by the customer enterprise in the hardware service stage is adjusted to the subsequent service stage.Finally,the optimal incentive parameters are determined and the model is validated by numerical experiments.Finally,based on the single-stage static model and two-stage dynamic model,this paper provides theoretical guidance and practical suggestions for enterprises to motivate SaaS cloud outsourcing.
Keywords/Search Tags:SaaS, principal-agent model, mechanism design, moral hazard, adverse selection
PDF Full Text Request
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