Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge,Corporate Social Responsibility And Investment Efficiency

As one of the three most important financial activities of an enterprise,investment activities are the main driving force for the growth and expansion of reproduction,and an important basis for the steady growth of future cash flows.The effective conduct of enterprise investment activities requires adequate funding.It is not enough to rely on internal financing alone.It is also necessary to continuously expand external financing channels.Equity pledge is a financing method that is convenient to operate and the corresponding control rights of pledged equity are not affected.It is favored by many listed companies,and the scale of equity pledge business is also growing.As of the end of 2018,in the Shanghai and Shenzhen cities Over 95% of the 3,554 listed companies are involved in equity pledge business.However,since 2014,the domestic stock market has experienced cliff-like declines many times.Equity pledge risks have become increasingly prominent as the company's growth rate has slowed and the company's stock price has fallen.Is the controlling shareholder a decision maker for corporate investment activities? How to reduce or compensate the risk of equity pledge by influencing the investment activities of enterprises? Existing research on controlling shareholder's equity pledge mainly focuses on the influence of controlling shareholder's equity pledge and its behavior on the performance,information disclosure,earnings management and innovation investment of listed companies.Impact of efficiency.At the same time,social responsibility is part of corporate strategic decision-making.Active implementation of corporate social responsibility can help build a good image,alleviate information asymmetry,strengthen the supervision of stakeholders,curb self-interest behavior of controlling shareholders,and improve investment efficiency.Therefore,in the context of deleveraging and risk prevention,it is of great value to study whether corporate social responsibility performance can alleviate the negative impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge.Based on the above research background,this article starts from the reality ofChina's capital market,and first reviews the relevant literature and research results in three aspects:equity pledge,investment efficiency and corporate social responsibility.Secondly,based on the theory of principal-agent,information asymmetry,corporate social responsibility,etc.,combined with the characteristics of equity pledge and investment activities and the impact of corporate social responsibility performance on corporate governance,this paper proposes the hypothesis of this paper.The data of China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2018 was selected for empirical inspection.Based on this,this paper further examined the effect mechanism of controlling shareholder's equity pledge on corporate investment efficiency.The robustness test of the main conclusions obtained in this paper is carried out by changing the method of measuring the explanatory variables and the variables being explained.It proves that the conclusions of this paper have certain robustness.Finally,relevant policy suggestions are put forward.Through analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)the pledge of controlling shareholder equity will significantly reduce the investment efficiency of the company;(2)the performance of corporate social responsibility can significantly weaken the negative impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on the investment efficiency of the company,and The weakening effect of state-owned enterprises and regions with higher levels of marketization is more obvious;(3)Controlling shareholder equity pledge will reduce the company's investment efficiency by aggravating the agency problems of listed companies and increasing the external financing costs of listed companies.The research significance of this paper lies in expanding the research scope of the economic consequences of controlling shareholder equity pledge from a theoretical perspective,enriching the research content of the factors affecting the investment efficiency of enterprises and the research results under the principal-agent theory.From a practical perspective,this article provides a theoretical basis for further improving China's equity pledge system,establishing a complete supervision system and an effective securities market regulatory system;at the same time,the research inthis article helps companies to better understand the controlling shareholder's equity pledge How does this personal behavior affect the company itself,helping the company and controlling shareholders choose the appropriate financing method to reduce the behavior that invades the interests of the company.