| In recent years,our country actively promotes the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises,making it clear that the mixed ownership reform is an effective way to reach the market-oriented governance transformation.Mixed ownership reform aims to bring the advantage of market perception into play by introducing non-state-owned capital’s equity fusion and cross-shareholding,so as to promote the transformation of state-owned enterprises.The current research focus on the state-owned enterprises which have been restructured,on this basis,non-state-owned shareholders are introduced to achieve equity diversity and checks and balances,which have a positive impact on corporate decision-making and management.However,only the realization of equity "Mixed" and "Joint" in the corporate governance role is limited.Because non-state-owned external shareholders generally hold low shares and can not form a counterbalance with state-owned controlling shareholders,this paper further focuses on the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders,and the level of equity governance to explore how to play a governance role.The quality of information disclosure is the key factor of corporate governance,which not only helps investors to understand the situation of the enterprise better,but also is the important foundation to ensure the healthy development of the capital market.Therefore,more and more research focuses on how to enhance the quality of information disclosure to enhance corporate governance and capital market development.Around the world,regulators and standards bodies have set up a series of systems and norms to promote the quality of information disclosure,such as mandatory disclosure requirements,accounting standards,corporate governance norms,and so on.In addition,more and more companies start to adopt the active disclosure strategy,through the public disclosure of more abundant and timely information to improve the investor’s trust and corporate image.However,improving the quality of information disclosure still faces challenges such as lack of transparency,incomplete information,and misleading information that is addressed by both regulators and companies.Therefore,improving the quality of corporate information disclosure has become one of the most critical issues of corporate governance.The sky-high salary of state-owned enterprise executives,as well as the huge pay gap within and between industries,has been widely questioned by all sectors of society.Based on the background of the system in China and the dynamic changes in the compensation system in our country in recent years,this paper makes a deep and systematic study of the compensation system of top management in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of pay-performance sensitivity,the purpose of this paper is to provide theoretical reference and practical basis for improving the compensation system of top managers in state-owned enterprises and to promote the reform of the income distribution system in state-owned enterprises.This paper examines the impact of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in SOE governance on executive compensation performance sensitivity,using data from 2008 to 2021a-share listed state-owned companies,and further analysis of information disclosure quality in non-state-owned shareholders and state-owned enterprise executive compensation performance sensitivity between play a part of the intermediary role.The results show that the increase of non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholding ratio can further enhance the performance sensitivity of top executives’ compensation,and the non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholding has a significant positive effect on the quality of information disclosure,the quality of information disclosure mediates the relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ ownership and the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.Finally,this paper makes some suggestions on how to increase the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in state-owned enterprises. |
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