Executive Compensation Incentives For The Finance Of Private Listed Companies In China Performance Impact

With the development of China's modern enterprise system and the deepening of the market-oriented reform of private enterprises,the issue of the correlation between executive compensation and corporate financial performance has always been the focus of academic and public attention.Based on the factors affecting executive compensation,this paper compares and analyzes the executive compensation of the private listed companies in China with the financial performance,equity incentives,and the impact of independent directors on the financial performance of the company.The research literature is sorted out.According to the theoretical basis of principal-agent theory,optimal contract theory and managerial power theory,the correlation between executive compensation and corporate financial performance of private enterprises in China is analyzed.This paper selects the Oriental Garden Company as the main research object,compares the case enterprise with its peers and its own financial performance data,and finds that the cash compensation part of the Oriental Garden executive compensation has a weak correlation with the financial performance of the enterprise,and the equity The correlation between compensation and financial indicators is more significant.Through this phenomenon,the author analyzes that it may be caused by factors such as excessive concentration of the equity system,inadequate supervision by the board of directors and the remuneration committee,and the dissemination of reasoning,from the small to the big,combined with the national conditions,can improve the executive compensation system of private listed companies in China.Related recommendations.