The manufacturer produces new products and remanufactured products,and sells them through traditional channels and electronic channels(E channels)separately,and the recycler recycles used products from the consumers.The whole process constitutes remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain(CLSC).There are green consumers and normal consumers in the market,facing different market situations,how to make optimal pricing decision,which is the main issues studied in this thesis.The main contents are as follows:Firstly,Stackelberg game theory is used to solve the optimal pricing decision of each company under the condition of manufacturer-led and retailer-led.This thesis analyzes the impact of consumers’ willingness on the members’ profits,and analyze the change of members’ profits and CLSC total profits.It is concluded that in the two dominate models the manufacturer’s profit is the highest,the retailer gets less,and the recycler gets the least in the CLSC.The retailer’s profit can be very close to the manufacturer’s profit under the retailer-led model.Secondly,the retailer’s sales efforts is considered in manufacturer-led model.The impact of retailer’s sales effort on pricing decisions and member profits is studied.The impact of the demand expansion coefficient is analyzed through numerical stimulation.It is concluded that the sales effort can increase the retailer’s profit by a very small level,but the retailer’s profit in such condition is still less than the retailer’s profit under retailer-led.Finally,retailer’s sales efforts and fair concern are both considered in the manufacturer-led model.The difference between the retailer’s profits under this condition and the retailer’s profits in manufacturer-led model is compared.Through the numerical stimulation,it is concluded that when the retailer has a fairness concern,when the fair concern reaches a certain value,the retailer’s profit will be equal to the manufacturer’s profit,but the retailer’s fairness concern is harmful to the profits of the CLSC. |