Research On Risk Allocation Of PPP Project On Rural Infrastructure

The contradiction between supply and demand of rural infrastructure in China is increasing,which seriously restricts the development of rural economy.On the one hand,the mode of providing infrastructure for the public sector is subject to financial constraints and the supply is limited;on the other hand,the backwardness of public sector construction,inadequate management experience,and rent-seeking corruption lead to low supply efficiency and waste of resources.Due to the public nature of rural infrastructure services,it is not enough to rely solely on government financial funds to invest in rural infrastructure.This is to actively explore the private sector's participation in rural infrastructure development,promote PPP project in rural infrastructure,and boost rural areas.Infrastructure supply side reforms offer new opportunities.The PPP model is a new paradigm for public-private capital cooperation and an important mechanism for sharing public interest and risk allocation between the public and private sectors.Rural infrastructure usually has large investment,long construction period,slow cost recovery,and many risk factors.The use of PPP model can better provide rural infrastructure in combination with the advantages of both public and private.However,the immature risk allocation mechanism in this area seriously restricts its development.It is of practical significance to study the risk allocation of rural infrastructure PPP projects.This thesis firstly combs and summarizes relevant literatures at home and abroad from the perspectives of rural infrastructure PPP project and risk allocation,expounds the theoretical basis of rural infrastructure PPP project,risk allocation and game theory;through literature research and case analysis,combined with rural areas The characteristics of infrastructure PPP projects,37 risk factors commonly found in rural infrastructure PPP projects;secondly,using static game model,based on the risk preference coefficient of public and private parties,the risk factors are divided into unilateral risk and shared risks,and unilaterally The risk determines the reasonable sharing subject,and then obtains the preliminary plan of risk allocation.Then,by constructing the bargaining model of private preference bidding,using the dynamic game idea under incomplete information,the calculation method of the shared risk sharing ratio of rural infrastructure PPP project is proposed.The research shows that the optimal sharing ratio is related to the negotiation loss coefficient,the degree of asymmetry between the public and private parties,and the information incompleteness.Finally,taking the PPP project of the Makou Town sewage treatment as a case,the risk factors that do not exist in the project are deleted,and finally this project 28 risk factors,risk appetite coefficient by the project based on 7 risks and calculate the optimal risk ratio of public and private parties to bear their own through bargaining game model.The innovation of the thesis lies in the combination of China's national conditions and the risk characteristics of rural infrastructure PPP projects,and proposes the key risk factors of rural infrastructure PPP projects;using game theory to conduct quantitative research on risk allocation.Using the static game model,the risk factors are divided into unilateral risk and shared risks;based on the dynamic game theory of bargaining,the optimal sharing ratio model of the participating participants is constructed,and the optimal Nash equilibrium solution of the model is obtained,thus obtaining the field.A method for determining the optimal sharing ratio of risk allocation.