Research On Shadow Banking Supervision Based On Evolutionary Game

After the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2008,governments and financial regulators in various countries generally believed that the hidden risks of shadow banking were the culprits of the financial crisis.Therefore,they strengthened the supervision of shadow banking.China's shadow banking came into being the context of financial innovation and financial reform,which has alleviated the plight of bank credit funds to a certain extent and promoted the development of the financial market.However,as the scale and type of scale banking are increasing and the business chain is extending,the potential financial risks are also becoming more and more prominent.In addition,China's shadow banking has business dealings with formal financial institutions and informal institutions.Once shadow banking is at risk,it will definitely cause losses to financial institutions and informal financial institutions.Therefore,preventing and resolving shadow banking risks and maintaining financial security have become an important part of China's financial supervision.In order to prevent shadow banking risks,in recent years China's regulatory agents have issued many regulatory measures for financial management,asset management,entrusted loans and other businesses.As a result,shadow banking risks are under certain control.However,shadow banking supervision is a long and complicated process.It is an important issue to how to effectively reduce the cost of shadow banking supervision and improve the efficiency of supervision.China's regulatory authorities and academia need to pay attention to and solve them.Therefore,this paper is based on evolutionary game theory to study the game relationship between regulators and shadow banking,in order to solve the problems faced by regulators in the process of shadow banking supervision.Specifically,this paper first sorts out and summarizes relevant domestic and foreign literature,including the relevant research results of shadow banking connotation,risk,and supervision.In addition,it also expounds the research status of evolutionary game theory in the economic field.Second,it introduces the concept and characteristics of shadow banking,and theoretically analyzes the necessity of shadow banking supervision.After that,it expounds the subject,object and content of shadow banking supervision,and then introduces the current situation of shadow banking supervision in China.This paper also analyzes the main problems existing in the process of the supervision of the shadow banking.In order to deeply study the game relationship between regulators and shadow banking,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the relationship between regulators and shadow banking,theoretically analyzes the strategic choice trends of the two subjects and uses Matlab software to carry out numerical simulation analysis.The increased supervision by regulators can promote the compliance operation of shadow banking.However,the excessive supervision will increase the regulatory cost of regulators.Therefore,when regulators supervise shadow banking,in addition to playing their own supervision roles,they should also use the power of the media to supervise shadow banking.Finally,in order to supervise the shadow banking more effectively,this paper is based on the analysis of the proceeding chapters,to put forward specific countermeasures and suggestions,including the following seven aspects: making clear the principles of China's shadow banking supervision;perfecting the supervision system of financial supervision institutions;protecting the rights and interests of the shadow banking consumers;improving the overall quality of the supervisory staff;perfecting the laws and regulations of the shadow banking supervision;giving full play to the ability of the media to supervise the public opinion;using artificial intelligence to prevent shadow banking risks.