Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Government Supervising Enterprises To Adopt Low-carbon Power Generation Technologies

Environmental pollution and energy consumption issues have restricted the economic growth of China seriously. The government has promulgated relevant policies of environmental protection to achieve the purpose of energy saving, whose implementation is inseparable from the effective regulatory mechanisms. The problems are complex and dynamic. They make it’s hard to achieve the desired results on prediction and control of environmental pollution. So it is necessary to study its regulatory mechanisms. Currently, in the analysis of environmental problems, traditional game theory approach ignores the uncertainty of limited rationality during dynamic game. However, evolutionary game under the condition of limited rationality is mainly focused on the analysis of the existence of evolutionary stable strategy, and is lack of study on control strategy. For the power sector, which is the biggest carbon emitter, it’s the best way to achieve the emission reduction targets of china by controlling carbon emission. Renewable energy has the unique features such as non-polluting and renewable. As a result, the most effective measure is to generate electricity by renewable energy.On the basis of the analyses of a variety of possible affecting factors, we build an evolutionary game model about the interaction between the environmental regulators and power plants. Using the model, we analyze the formation mechanism of the conflict and evolution trends between environmental regulators and power plants’ emissions, investigate the evolution and the presence of evolutionary stable strategies theoretically, analyze the evolutionary path of their policy choice behaviors when interacting, in order to get the various affected factors of system evolution equilibrium direction and its detail impacting results. Furthermore, we have tried to find the best incentive measures to guide the power plants to generate electricity by renewable energy.The results show that, the strategy combination that high levels of supervision and exceeding quota is the desirable evolution equilibrium of the supervising game. The suggestions offered to the government are showed as follows:first, the government can encourage technological innovation for electricity generation by renewable energy, which can reduce the cost of electricity generation by renewable energy but raise the relative cost of electricity generation by general energy; second, another suggestion is to increase the subsidies for electricity generation by renewable energy and pollution discharge fees for electricity generation by general energy; third, the government can promote the importance of environmental protection and improve the environment protection sense of the companies, which can reduce administrative costs for the environmental regulators; forth, the government can increase discount rate, which may lead to the companies to invest in the equipment and technology related to renewable power generation because the depreciation can make people are keen on immediate investments; at last, higher level local governments can strengthen the supervision of environmental regulators. Furthermore, with the study of detailed examples, we prove that the best incentive measures for the power plants is light award and heavy penalty.