Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Internal Governance Of State-owned T Company Under The Background Of Mixed Ownership Reform

According to the principal-agent theory,the managers of state-owned enterprises are the agents of state-owned enterprises.As the representatives of state-owned shareholders,their own efforts and subjective state will directly affect the value of the company,and also affect the evaluation of shareholders on them.In reality,due to the system and mechanism,there are many defects in the incentive of state-owned enterprise executives.The Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed "to actively develop the mixed ownership economy".Under the background of mixed ownership reform,in addition to the changes of ownership structure and system mechanism,the content of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises is still an important standard to measure whether the enterprises operate healthily.As an important part of the company's internal governance system,a scientific and reasonable incentive mechanism will play an important role in the development of the company.Therefore,it is necessary to study the incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers.Based on the principal-agent theory,this study starts with the related meaning of corporate internal governance,and points out the composition of corporate internal governance mechanism.The incentive mechanism of corporate internal governance is essentially the incentive mechanism for executives.This study expounds the content of the incentive mechanism of the internal governance of the company,and summarizes the theoretical situation of the incentive mechanism of the executives of the state-owned enterprises in China based on the relevant research of scholars at home and abroad.From the aspects of reward incentive mechanism,residual control and management control incentive mechanism,reputation or honor incentive mechanism,employment and dismissal incentive mechanism,this paper analyzes the characteristics of various incentive mechanisms,and puts forward that some or some incentive mechanisms need to be comprehensively considered in order to give full play to their best incentive effect.This study takes the state-owned T Group Company under the background of mixed ownership reform as an example to analyze the problems of executive incentive mechanism of T company and put forward countermeasures.This paper uses the methods of literature research,case study,examination paper survey,interview and so on,through the investigation of T company's senior executives to get more detailed basic information.Combined with the development of T company and the change of property right structure,this paper analyzes and summarizes the current situation and influencing factors of the incentive mechanism affecting the internal governance of T company,and studies and discusses the problems existing in the incentive mechanism of the senior management of T company.As a traditional state-owned enterprise,there are some problems in the incentive mechanism of T company's managers,such as insufficient incentive strength and low satisfaction of senior managers,more material incentive and less spiritual incentive,less incentive methods,more rigid constraint and exit mechanism for senior managers.In view of the problems existing in the incentive mechanism of T company,this study proposes that we should perfect the professional manager system,the internal distribution system,the appointment system,the incentive effect of the product market and the capital market,the establishment and improvement of the manager's risk mortgage system,etc.in the state-owned enterprises,which are suitable for the combination of some incentive mechanisms of different executives,So as to give full play to the best effect of manager's incentive mechanism,and make the goals of principal and agent converge.This study will provide some reference and reference for other state-owned enterprises or state-owned group companies in the reform of mixed ownership in the design of manager incentive mechanism.