The Impact Of CEO Tenure Of Listed Companies On The Performance Revealing Behavior

How company executives manage company information disclosure has always been a hot issue in financial research.The study found that in order to obtain career advancement or private gain,the CEO has an incentive to manage the company's information flow to influence the market's judgment on the company's prospects and its personal capabilities.The high-level echelon theory pointed out that the company's management,especially the CEO,its age,gender,tenure,educational background,ethnicity,socio-economic foundation,will affect its decision-making behavior.Among them,the term of office as one of the characteristics of top management is a key factor that affects the financial behavior of enterprises.Among the many background characteristics of executives,research on CEO tenure is relatively unpopular,and most of them focus on major strategic decisions such as R&D expenditure,investment efficiency,and earnings management.Few researches in the field of information disclosure.In addition,according to the five-stage model of tenure,the tenure of senior executives can be divided into five distinct phases.At each stage,the management style,effort level,risk preference and job interest of the executives are very different.Then,as an important strategic decision maker of the company,how the characteristics of the tenure of the CEO's term affect the company's performance forecast information disclosure behavior is worth exploring.Since the end of the 1990 s,China 's performance forecasting system has been continuously developed and improved.Analyzing the performance forecasting behavior of listed companies can help investors and analysts to identify relevant company information and make correct decisions,which can help the health of the entire capital market.Order development.Compared with the voluntary disclosure system in developed capital markets,China's listed companies' performance forecast system also includes mandatory disclosure.In the case of voluntary disclosure,the management has certain freedom to choose the form of disclosure,the amount of surplus forecast and the time of disclosure.In addition to being influenced by management 's subjective motivational intentions,the disclosure characteristics are also objectively constrained by the level of managers.Eventually,there are discrepancies in the disclosure of performance announcements of listed companies.Therefore,the differences in listed companies' performance announcement disclosure forms,forecast deviations,and disclosure time points will be affected by the different decision-making behaviors of executives,especially CEOs.The CEO 's tenure factor cannot be ignored.According to the relevant documents of executive tenure,tenure includes two dimensions: the existing tenure and the expected tenure.Existing term refers to the actual number of years the CEO is in office.Expected term refers to the length of time that the CEO is expected to be in office in the future.Both dimensions will have an impact on the CEO 's decision-making motivation.At present,there is a lack of research on the effect of CEO tenure on the disclosure of performance announcements of listed companies,and there is no literature to analyze its impact on the disclosure of performance announcements of listed companies from the perspective of the CEO's expected tenure.Based on the high-level echelon theory and the five-stage model of tenure,this article selects the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018,and analyzes and examines the effect of CEO tenure on the characteristics of management performance disclosure.Regression analysis results show that:(1)The longer the CEO's existing term,the more ambiguous the form of performanceannouncement disclosure and the smaller the forecast deviation.Among them,the subjectivity of voluntary disclosure makes it easier for us to observe the impact of CEO tenure on performance announcement disclosure behavior than compulsory disclosure,so we focus on the voluntary disclosure group.In the case of voluntary disclosure,the longer the CEO 's existing tenure,the more obscure the performance forecast disclosure form,the smaller the forecast deviation,and the less timely;while in the case of mandatory disclosure,the CEO 's existing term is only negatively related to the forecast deviation of the performance forecast The relationship is not significant with the ambiguity and timeliness of performance forecasts.(2)The longer the CEO's expected term,the more accurate the performance announcement disclosure format and the greater the forecast deviation.In the case of voluntary disclosure,the longer the CEO 's expected term,the more precise the performance forecast disclosure form,the greater the forecast deviation,and the stronger the timeliness;in the case of mandatory disclosure,the CEO 's expected term only has a positive correlation with the forecast deviation of the performance forecast The relationship with the ambiguity and timeliness of performance forecasts is not significant.(3)Different property rights affect the CEO's tenure and performance forecast characteristics.In non-state-owned enterprises,the CEO tenure is significantly positively correlated with the ambiguity of the performance announcement disclosure form,and is significantly negatively correlated with the performance forecast prediction error.This paper uses high-level echelon theory and the five-stage model as the theoretical basis to enrich the research results of the CEO's background characteristics and performance forecast information disclosure,which helps external investors and analysts to identify company forecast information and the regulatory department to improve relevant systems Regulations.