Managerial Power,institutional Investor Heterogeneity And Investment Efficiency

As one of the three major economic activities of the company,high-quality investment behavior can enhance the value of the enterprise and promote the stable and long-term development of the company.In theory,investment behavior should focus on the expected future earnings of the project,aiming at maximizing the value of the enterprise.However,in reality,the phenomenon of inefficiency investment is common in listed companies in China,and it is divided into two situations: excessive investment and insufficient investment.Managerial power is one of the important factors affecting the efficiency of enterprise investment.Due to the principal-agent problem arising from information asymmetry,there is a disagreement between the shareholders and managers of the company.The investment decisions of enterprises depend largely on the judgment of managers.When internal governance mechanisms are not perfect,managers are likely to obtain more power than they should get from positions,resulting in various unethical behaviors,including reducing the investment efficiency of the company.Therefore,it is necessary to put power into the cage of the system and then supervise and restrict the managerial power by establishing a sound internal and external governance mechanism.In recent years,due to the rapid economic development and the promotion of relevant policies,the types of institutional investors in China have been increasing,and the shareholding ratio hasalso increased rapidly,it has exceeded 30% by the end of 2018.Regarding whether institutional investors can play a role in corporate governance,the academic views are mainly divided into three categories: “effective supervision hypothesis”,“negative supervision hypothesis” and “ineffective supervision hypothesis”.This thesis firstly explores the influence of managerial power on the efficiency of enterprise investment.And on the basis of previous studies,on the one hand,we refine the managerial power and study the influence of eight factors which constitute managerial power on the efficiency of enterprise investment.On the other hand,we arrange the managerial power form low to high in an ascending sort order,and then classify it to study the influence of different degrees of managerial power on the investment efficiency of enterprises.Then,we add institutional investors,the manipulated variable to the model to study its impact on the relationship between managerial power and investment efficiency.Finally,the institutional investors are classified to explore whether different types of institutional investors can actively participate in corporate governance with their professional capabilities,effectively restrict the managerial power,and achieve the purpose of improving the investment efficiency.The empirical research shows that the increase of managerial power will significantly reduce the efficiency of enterprise investment,but the eight factors that constitute the comprehensive indicators of managerial power play different roles.After classification regression according to the lever of managerial power,we find that only low managerial power has a significant positive correlation with corporate inefficient investment,moderate managerial power has no significant correlation with corporate inefficient investment,and high managerial power has a certain inhibitory effect on inefficient investment.Institutional investors' shareholding can effectively restrain the positive relationship between managerial power and corporate inefficient investment and excessive investment,but the inhibition of insufficient investment is not obvious.Through further research,we can find only pressure resistant institutional investors can effectively suppress the positive relationship between managerial power and corporate inefficient investment,while pressure sensitive institutional investors,stable institutional investors and transactional institutional investors do not have thisability.This shows that different types of institutional investors have different adjustment effects on managerial power and investment efficiency.