An Empirical Study On Managerial Power,The Heterogeneity Of Institutional Investor And Risk

The decision-making of the enterprise is the coexistence of risk and return.The high return corresponds to the high risk,and the low-return project is often less risky.The enterprise needs to make a trade-off between the two.Corporate risk taking reflects the choice of risk in the various decisions of the company and is the preference of the decision makers for risk.Moderate risk taking can bring a good return on investment to the enterprise,which is conducive to the improvement of corporate performance and the competitiveness of the enterprise in the industry.The insufficient or high risk of the enterprise will bring adverse effects to the enterprise.Insufficient risk-taking of enterprises will cause enterprises to miss favorable development opportunities.Failure to make decisions due to excessive risk-taking will seriously damage corporate value.In the context of China's economy to achieve high-quality development and innovation-driven total factor productivity growth,whether from a macro perspective or micro-enterprises,how to make corporate decision-makers actively take risks while avoiding excessive risk-taking behavior is an extremely important topic.From the data analysis of China's A-share listed companies,the phenomenon of"two jobs concurrently","lower proportion of independent directors" and"management shareholding" is more common among listed companies in China;among listed companies with state-owned background,Equity is generally concentrated,and there are still phenomena such as "ownership absence" and "one share".The imperfect internal governance structure of listed companies and the lack of power checks and balances make the management of listed companies in China have more influence than their control rights,and have greater discretion in decision-making,which can influence the risk of enterprises through the choice of decision-making.As a rational economic person,corporate management seeks more personal gains.Its risk-taking decisions may deviate from the expectations of corporate shareholders and are not conducive to the long-term value of the company.In recent years,China's institutional investors have developed rapidly with the support of a series of related policies,and have become the subject of external supervision of enterprises that have received much attention.In the existing literature,only a few scholars have studied the relationship between management power and corporate risk-taking,and there is no unified opinion on whether the two are"positively related" or "negatively related".Domestic and foreign scholars' research on the institutional governance effect of institutional investors can also be divided into "effective supervision" effect,"ineffective supervision" effect and "negative supervision" effect.China's economy needs high-quality development,and the capital market also proposes high-quality development.It studies the relationship between management power and risk-taking in enterprises,especially the influence of institutional investors' governance effects on the relationship between the two,that is,whether institutional investors can Helping enterprises to take risks and improve corporate value reasonably has certain theoretical and practical value.Based on extensive reading of the literature,this paper determines the framework of the research in this paper.In this paper,China's institutional investors are divided into two categories:"pressure resistance type" and "pressure sensitive type".The 2012-18 A-share listed companies in China are selected as research samples to verify the management power and corporate risk commitment of enterprises through empirical design.On the basis of this,we will further explore the governance effect of heterogeneous institutional investors' shareholdings.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:First,the greater the power of management in the enterprise,the lower the risk exposure of the enterprise,the negative correlation between the two,and this negative relationship is more significant in the sample of state-owned enterprises;Pressure-resisting institutional investors can play an active governance role in listed companies,use their professional capabilities and information advantages to supervise management behavior in the enterprise,constrain the excessive expansion of management power,and promote management to take risks reasonably;Investors in pressure-sensitive institutions mainly profit from short-term transactions.They are unwilling to pay too much for the supervision companies.In order to maintain business relations with listed companies,they are often consistent with management's opinions.The pursuit of interests is easy to reach a "strategic alliance" and further weaken the risk-taking of enterprises.Based on the problems reflected in the main research results,this paper will put forward specific suggestions from the following points:first,the recommendations to the enterprise,first,the management power should be rationally allocated;second,the internal supervision mechanism should be further improved;third,the listed enterprises It is possible to actively introduce pressure-tolerant institutional investors to optimize corporate governance.The policy recommendations in this paper,first,improve the institutional investor structure in the capital market;second,help institutional investors establish a correct investment philosophy and guide their investment behavior;third,targeted promotion of institutional investors' supervision and management System.