Research On The Influence Mechanism Of Information Disclosure And Price Discrimination On Crowdfunding Performance

Micro,small,and medium-sized enterprises(MSMEs)are small in size but large in scale,which are key to generating economic growth.However,MSMEs are faced with greater pressure due to tight funds,low efficiency,subdued markets,and so on.Crowdfunding is highly matched with the development needs of MSMEs,provides a new idea for solving the dilemma of them.Therefore,under the background of “mass entrepreneurship and innovation”,how can MSMEs make better use of the crowdfunding platform and set up an appropriate project to realize the triple wins of project sponsors,investors and crowdfunding platforms are of great importance for project sponsors.After citing and summarizing previous scholars' researches from crowdfunding,information disclosure,and price discrimination,this thesis combined the problem of information asymmetry in crowdfunding,theoretically demonstrated the positive effect of information disclosure on crowdfunding performance based on signal theory and information discrimination theory,and analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of price discrimination in crowdfunding based on the theory of price discrimination.Then,by using the project data of the first domestic crowdfunding platform "Demohour",this thesis presented a relatively complete study of the results and partial pathways of the impact of information disclosure and price discrimination on crowdfunding performance,and found that the amount and the influence of information disclosure will send positive signals to the potential investors,helping the potential investors to transform into actual investors,which is conducive to the improvement of crowdfunding performance.Price discrimination allows investors to match their investment willingness with price gradients settings,helping project sponsors to capture more consumers.However,information disclosure will help potential investors form certain investment-return expectations,when the price gradients setting is inconsistent with their expectations,the level of price discrimination will negatively regulate the positive impact of information disclosure on crowdfunding performance.The above conclusion holds within a certain threshold,the excessive information will form the overload of information,which is not conducive to crowdfunding performance,thus the relationship between the amount of information disclosure and price discrimination on crowdfunding performance is actually an inverted U-shape.Combining theoretical and empirical analysis,this thesis puts forward the following suggestions to project sponsors of the crowdfunding: Project sponsors need to disclose information truthfully,accurately,completely,and efficiently,pay more attention to the quality of information disclosure,avoid the negative impact of information overload as much as possible,and fully exploit the needs of investors through the means of price discrimination;the government should protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors while recognizing price discrimination based on innovation and encouraging innovation premiums,thereby weakening the indirect negative impact of price discrimination on crowdfunding performance.