| The thesis analyzes three aspects of executive power. In Executive Power and the Law, I analyze the effect of judicial uncertainty on the executive's incentives to use its discretionary powers. I study a formal model in which the executive takes an action without knowing with certainty whether a court will or will not uphold the legality of his action. I show that more judicial uncertainty induces the executive to take more aggressive action, regardless of the executive's attitude toward risk. I also analyze the effect of communication on the executive's and the court's welfare and show that both parties benefit if the court announces the range of legal actions before the executive acts. The findings provide novel policy recommendations regarding the effects of legal doctrines regulating executive powers, as well as the optimal design of judicial review of executive actions. The key policy implications are: (i) narrow, case-by-case court rulings on executive powers reinforce legal uncertainty and embolden the executive to act aggressively and (ii) courts should exercise abstract review in addition to ex-post review of executive actions.;In Anti-Terrorism, Surveillance, and Executive Power, I address the question of whether increasing the government's surveillance powers help preventing a terrorist attack. I show that increasing surveillance powers does not necessarily enhance security even if we abstract way from the civil liberties losses and only consider the effect of surveillance powers on enhancing security. In addition, I show that an agency problem exists: the optimal security-enhancing surveillance policy is different than the government's most preferred surveillance policy if the probability of a terrorist attack does not decrease with less restrictions on surveillance powers. These findings contribute to the current public, policy and scholarly debates regarding the expansion of the government's surveillance powers at the expense of privacy rights in the context of fighting terrorism.;In Presidential Rulemaking, I analyze the president's impact on agency rulemaking. I perform a multilevel logistic regression on the outcome of presidential rulemaking review by using a new data set consisting of 1,984 major regulations reviewed between 1981 and 2007 by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, a unit within the Office of Management and Budget. I show that the probability of OIRA intervention in rulemaking increases (i) with the president's time in office (ii) in a presidential reelection year, (iii) if the president enjoys higher popularity, and (iv) if the rule being reviewed is more salient. Moreover, OIRA intervention is higher in the Clinton administration as compared to the Reagan administration. These findings suggest that all presidents, regardless of their partisanship, use OIRA review to control agency rulemaking, but the direction of OIRA intervention depends on the president's regulatory orientation. The analysis illustrates the nature and scope of presidential intervention in rulemaking and contributes to studies of political control, administrative law, and regulation. |
