| When a country adopts a new electoral system, analysts generally depict the change as part of larger systemic transformation, such as transitions from communism in the 1990s, or the confluence of peculiar circumstances, for example, a 1987 campaign promise in New Zealand. There is nevertheless mounting empirical evidence that political elites modify electoral rules to serve their own ends, while grassroots organizations push electoral reform as a solution to faults in the political status quo. Researchers have delved into the causes of electoral system change, herein referred to as “electoral reform,” and the conditions under which it is likely to occur, but we have yet to understand fully the long-term consequences for the political system, especially in regards to the influence on voters. This thesis explores the impact of electoral reform on one aspect of political behavior: strategic voting. With data from a laboratory experiment conducted in France and Hungary, I use three competing explanations from rational choice, behavioral economic and cultural modernization theories to evaluate post-reform voting behavior. I find that the laboratory results are supportive of the rational choice and cultural modernization explanations, such that post-reform voting behavior is dependent upon the unique cultural and historical attributes of the country under examination. |
