Echoes of the past: Comparing Soviet and US counterinsurgency doctrine & strategy in Afghanistan

For more than nine years the Soviet Union engaged a determined opponent in a counterinsurgency (COIN) conflict in Afghanistan. The United States is presently facing what appears to be an equally determined foe in that same country, and has now been waging a counterinsurgency campaign for nearly as long as the USSR's.;This paper seeks to compare current US counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine in Afghanistan with Soviet counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine, examining whether the US is repeating errors made by the Soviet Union made in prosecuting its war. This paper also attempts to discern lessons learned from the Soviet conflict that may be applicable to the current US counterinsurgency effort.;In comparing Soviet and US doctrine and strategy, this paper employs primary source material from both countries. These materials are supplemented by several case studies comparing the leaders of the Afghan government under the DRA and the present US-backed Karzai Administration.;This paper concludes that there are no major similarities between Soviet doctrine and US COIN doctrine. It does identify some similarities between US and Soviet strategy, particularly with regard to the protection of urban areas. These similarities, however, do not necessarily portend the failure of the US effort. The paper further suggests that the strongest similarity between the two conflicts is the lack of participation by the Afghan government in COIN efforts---both militarily and politically.;The paper concludes by offering a series of lessons learned and associated policy recommendations.