| This dissertation explores the ineffectiveness of development assistance as an intervention into a complex system, and makes a contribution in explaining how and why this is so. Specifically, this issue is explored within a charity-philanthropy context. As the build component of counterinsurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan is currently the most high-stakes, policy relevant example of US development assistance, this dissertation explores these issues within a COIN context.;There are six chapters. First, the introduction outlines the context, problem statement, and structure for the rest of the dissertation. As this dissertation builds upon a wide range of literature, the second chapter presents a review of the research. Chapter three is a theoretical chapter outlining what self-sustaining development is, why it is important, and the necessary conditions for it to exist.;To provide an empirical basis, chapter four analyzes the USAID programs in Afghanistan from 2002--2012. The main finding of this chapter is that while the US relied (and still relies) upon philanthropy to develop, its approach in Afghanistan is primarily one of subsidization. In other words, the US approaches development within a COIN context in a fundamentally different (and possibly incompatible) manner than which it approaches its own development. This is unlikely to lead to self-sustaining development in Afghanistan.;The fifth chapter builds upon the fourth, exploring the implications of charity, philanthropy, and preferences for charity using a computational simulation. Its main contribution is that philanthropy can be beneficial even without development, but charity and charity preferences are highly destabilizing for the recipient country. The implication of this is that the US development assistance strategy in Afghanistan is unlikely to lead to self-sustaining development, and is likely to be destabilizing, working against overall COIN objectives. Finally, the sixth chapter presents conclusions and policy implications. |
