| In this dissertation, I examine the credibility of moral intuitions and their relation to moral principles and background theories, as represented in the method of reflective equilibrium (MRE) originally set out by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. As part of elucidation and justification of this method, I make frequent comparisons to scientific methodology, which shares close similarities to the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that MRE provides a non-foundationalist moral methodology which appears to be a promising approach to moral justification and moral adjudication.;Moral intuitions are a crucial feature of MRE: they serve as the starting points of moral theory construction and testing in a similar way as empirical data serve as the starting points of scientific hypothesis construction and testing. Moral intuitions - just as any data - can sometimes be mistaken, however. Upon what basis can the credibility of a moral intuition be determined? I examine how the credibility of an intuition can be determined by examining its "etiology." The etiology of a moral intuition is its causal origin, which includes sociological, psychological, evolutionary and biological factors, some of which might impugn its credibility.;Since intuition credibility determination is essential to the methodology of reflective equilibrium, I endeavor to show that moral intuitions can be vetted in nontrivial and noncircular ways. This filtration process discredits those initial moral judgments that are determined to be error-disposed. These resulting noncredible intuitions are then excluded from the set of considered judgments, which serve as the provisional starting points for ethical theory construction and testing.;Ultimately, I will show that the moral methodology of reflective equilibrium, when theoretically developed and empirically substantiated, provides a significant contribution to moral philosophy. In particular, this fortified methodology provides further traction in ethical debate and adjudication. I exemplify this point in the final chapter, demonstrating how intuition credibility determination lends defense to a certain form of utilitarianism against certain traditional intuition-based attacks, and I show how the triple adjustment between intuitions, moral principles and background theories, understood in the context of wide reflective equilibrium, can assuage such objections. |
