Pick your poison: Banking regulations, macroeconomic management, and moral hazard in OECD economies |
Posted on:2011-09-17 | Degree:M.A | Type:Thesis |
University:The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill | Candidate:Winecoff, William Kindred | Full Text:PDF |
GTID:2449390002966031 | Subject:Political science |
Abstract/Summary: | |
This paper argues that banks operating in systems where monetary and regulatory authority are unified in a central bank expect and receive preferential policies, and so act less prudently than do banks in other systems. This moral hazard arises when the natural tension between counter-cyclical monetary policy and pro-cyclical regulatory policy is relaxed. I test the hypothesis using a time series cross-sectional econometric analysis of OECD countries from 1990-2007. The results strongly support the claim that there is a relationship between prudential behaviors of banks and the location of regulatory authority, and provides evidence that moral hazard exists when regulatory and monetary authority are unified. I conclude by discussing the implications of the analysis for governance at the domestic and international levels. |
Keywords/Search Tags: | Moral hazard, Authority, Regulatory |
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