| This dissertation is comprised of three papers, each of which is concerned with the grounding of practical normativity. Two competing accounts of that issue have dominated philosophical discussion on the topic. According to Source Internalism, all practical reasons derive their normative force in virtue of a relation in which they stand with the actual or hypothetical pro-attitudes of agents. Opposed to this view is Source Externalism, according to which no practical reasons derive their normative force in that way, but instead carry that force either brutely, or in virtue of a relation in which they stand with facts about value.;In the first two papers of my project, I argue against each of the dominant accounts, and further argue that an almost entirely overlooked alternative – Source Hybridism – is preferable to each. The Argument in Chapter 1 addresses the extensional shortcomings of internalism, and offers a way to avoid those shortcomings for hybridism. In Chapter 2, I focus on two versions of Source Externalism, and argue that an extensionally adequate version of externalism must be committed to either an implausible account of practical reasoning, or an implausible thesis regarding the relationship between desire-satisfaction and well-being. The chapter concludes with a consideration of objections to Source Hybridism.;In the third and final chapter, I continue the defensive work begun at the conclusion of Chapter 2. Here, I address in detail a popular objection to externalist approaches, one that also threatens my preferred hybridist theory. According to the objection, given a plausible evolutionary etiology of our normative attitudes, an externalist approach to the grounding of practical reasons results in epistemological disaster – namely, that it would be a massive coincidence were any of our normative beliefs true. I argue that, although it is promising in many ways, a recent response to this objection fails. I show how the spirit of the response can be rescued by offering a novel argument meant to undermine the evolutionary objection. |
