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A defense of ontological deflationism

Posted on:2013-04-03Degree:M.AType:Thesis
University:University of WyomingCandidate:Zavala, Pablo MFull Text:PDF
GTID:2455390008489238Subject:Philosophy
Abstract/Summary:
What is there? and, What is the nature of the things that exist? are examples of metaphysical questions. However, one engages in metametaphysical issues when one takes a step back and asks queries regarding metaphysical debates. These metametaphysical issues may include such interrogations as, Do metaphysical questions have objective answers? Those that respond in the affirmative to this latter question are said to be ontological realists who hold that each of their positions is objectively right and that their opponents are objectively wrong. Those that reply in the negative are considered to be ontological anti-realists. And by a deflationary view I mean one that plays down or rejects the claim that there is an objective fact of the matter regarding metaphysical questions. In this thesis, I intend to defend a particular ontological deflationist position whereby the truth-value of existential claims depends on the language one is using.
Keywords/Search Tags:Ontological, Metaphysical questions
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