| In this thesis I empirically analyze the contractual structure in the movie industry within and across boundaries of the firm. In this industry, a movie distributor contracts with different exhibitors to show its movie on their screens. Due to incompleteness in these contracts, specifying ownership of decision rights over screen use is important. The evidence presented here indicates that integrated theaters show their own movies two weeks longer than other movies. The control that integrated firms have on their own theaters as distribution channels leads movies of uncertain quality to be shown at distributor-owned theaters. Across boundaries of firms, I examine contract renegotiation in the movie industry as part of an informal contract between distributors and exhibitors. For this purpose, I use a unique dataset of revenue-sharing contracts and renegotiation outcomes in the Spanish movie industry. I find that movies performing below average are renegotiated more often. Following this, I investigate the existence of learning across periods by the economic agents and find evidence of it. I conclude that this mechanism enhances efficiency, as long as learning allows firms to cut movie runs optimally*.;*This dissertation is a compound document (contains both a paper copy and a CD as part of the dissertation). The CD requires the following system requirements: Adobe Acrobat. |
