Politics, immorality and eros: The role of love in the political theory of Hannah Arendt

The central issue I address in my dissertation is Hannah Arendt's solution to the problem of how to reconcile various forms of love for the sake of political life. The problem is that some loves, such as love of honor (philotimia ) and love of God (caritas), often conflict with each other. The antithesis between the individual and the state, and the consequent problem of how to prioritize one's obligations to the state is conceived, in this work, in terms of how to prioritize these disparate forms of love. I argue that Arendt's originality lies in her appropriation of one particular form of love, philotimia (love of honor), as a way of creating a new understanding of civic life. However, she does not simply argue that we must be more like the ancient Greeks. She bases her democratic public realm theory on a new principle that she calls amor mundi, love of the world. My fast claim is that Arendt views philotimia as the cause of amor mundi. The erotic longing for honor is not an atavistic product of Arendt's alleged Hellenophilia; it is the heart of her political theory, and we cannot understand her notion of amor mundi apart from it. If amor mundi, as caused by the love of honor, is the ‘what’ and ‘why’ or Arendt's politics, then her interpretation of action is the ‘how.’ Although Arendt believes debate constitutes the very essence of political life, action is not confined to debate. Rather, debate is only one part of everything that goes on when political action occurs. I argue that Arendt understands action as the tripartite process of beginning (archein), debating and carrying through (prattein) an endeavor initiated in the public realm. The first stage is the act of a citizen voicing a political proposal to his peers. Second, the debate that ensues about the proposal. Third, the act of carrying through the initiative. The second part of my dissertation articulates my interpretation Arendt's theory of action.