| On March 10, 1952, the USSR proposed the creation of a reunified, rearmed and neutral Germany. A year before Stalin's death, this was the last overture he tendered on the "German question." However, the bid failed and Germany remained divided for another thirty-eight years. Why? Although well-known in Germany for its connection to a "stab-in-the-back" theory, the "March note" is virtually forgotten amongst English-language scholars. This is unfortunate because the case is invaluable for understanding both why Germany remained divided and what factors eventually made reunification possible. Further, a study of the American rationale for rejecting Stalin's offer of German unity is indispensable for comprehending how the United States made foreign-policy decisions in the early part of the Cold War. Lastly, the "battle of the notes" between the USSR and the Western Allies provides a useful lesson in the tactics of international diplomacy. |