Building democracy in Mexico: Party, citizen and Rule of Law

This dissertation examines Mexican political system and its process of democratization. It intends to advance in the current of thought that claims that democracy is a social and a political concept. It is my hypothesis that when democracy is limited to building political parties and achieving fair elections, weak citizenry and disrespect for Rule of Law can prevail. Parties do not make citizens and competitiveness does not strengthen the Rule of Law. Mexican case shows that without a strong citizenry and rule of law, democracy's chances to consolidate are limited. The theoretical chapter is a deconstruction of the concept of democracy. I take position on the debate of democracy's concept. I support the idea that two different process of transition are needed and I provide historical evidence to show that parties are not a necessary condition to it. Democracy is not a necessary outcome once fair elections are granted. The second part deals with the historical research from long perspectives. Through the Congress's speeches I reviewed the process of making laws and how politicians justify their decisions. The analysis is focus on how the regime was build around revolutionary values where citizens did not count. I try to explain how some of the authoritarian features of the Mexican political regime appeared and were institutionalized after the Revolution of 1917. What happened in the first period of attempted liberalization, 1963 to 1977. Finally I studied the period that begins with the political reform of 1977 to the electoral reform of 1997. I explain why as the electoral system was reformed the periods of political stability became shorter and the subsequent political crisis became more complex. In the third part there are studies of particular cases where special situation is examined. Here it became clear how the usual ways of the old political system break without democratic processes agreed or institutions to replace them.