The military as an interest articulator during the period of democratic consolidation: Insights from the late twentieth century Argentina and Chile

During the past two decades, the dramatic rebirth of democracy in many Latin American countries has prompted a resurgent interest in civilian control of the armed forces. Given the history of military intervention in Latin America, however, there was still the question of whether the armed forces would play a genuinely subordinate role under the newly established civilian rule.;To examine how the military behaves in a post-authoritarian era, it was hypothesized in this research that the mode of the military's articulated interests would depend largely on two crucial factors: the military's capability to articulate its perceived interests, and the incentives provided by the civilian government. Based on this hypothesis, political experiences in two sample countries--Argentina and Chile--were compared and contrasted regarding the military's articulated interests during the attempted consolidation of the democratic regimes.;In the case of Argentina, its devastating defeat in the Falkland War in 1982 left the Argentine military in a debilitated condition which allowed the succeeding civilian president, Alfonsin, to launch an ambitious project to reduce the military's material, social, and political interests simultaneously. Although the Argentine officers repeatedly protested Alfonsin's policy, they felt particularly uncomfortable about his handling of human rights trials. Throughout the repeated military rebellions of the late 1980s and 1990, the Argentine military advocated amnesty from human rights abuses (political interest) over issues of economic well-being and status.;In Chile, two civilian presidents, Aylwin and Frei, took a cautious approach in dealing with the armed forces during the country's democratic consolidation period. Nevertheless, they steadily sought ways to amend the military-sponsored constitution and to remove General Pinochet from the post of army commander. By launching protests in 1990 and 1993, however, the Chilean military pursued its institutional autonomy and deferred civilian oversight.;To summarize, neither the Argentine nor the Chilean military used violent methods to articulate its material interests. Unlike many private interest groups, the militaries in Argentina and Chile have been the least affected by material incentives. Meanwhile, they have reacted strongly in their social and political interests.