| The thesis asks how some weak states manage not only to deter more powerful challengers, but to achieve cooperation and reach conciliation with them, without, however, surrendering their autonomy or independence. An explanatory framework is proposed which centers around various levels of domestic cohesion and the regional distribution of power (hegemonic or multipolar). The framework proposes that states with higher levels of domestic cohesion have greater opportunity to achieve conciliation. The regional distribution of power determines how those resources gained from cohesion are deployed. The framework also assumes that leaders must seek domestic pacification before addressing the external challenge. Depending on the particular combination of cohesion and region, a target state will likely adopt certain strategies for deterrence. The framework is applied to three cases: Singapore, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and Sri Lanka. Singapore started as non-cohesive in a multipolar region, but became cohesive. Taiwan began its "quasi-independent" existence in 1949 as non-cohesive in a hegemonic region, but became cohesive. Sri Lanka, located in a hegemonic region dominated by the hegemonic India, lost cohesion over the years. The states which became cohesive also experienced greater foreign policy success, and eventually were more likely to deter their challengers and even achieve some measure of cooperation with them. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, failed to deter India; the latter not only became involved in the Sri Lankan civil war but eventually deployed troops on the island and reasserted control over Sri Lanka's foreign policy. The foreign policy behavior of each state corresponds to the framework predictions. Turning to international relations theory, I evaluate realism, interdependence, and international society explanations of these deterrence findings. I find that the international society perspective best explains the ability of each state to achieve (or not to achieve) deterrence and conciliation. |
