Essays in the political economy of contracting: An institutional analysis of private sector participation in urban public transport

This dissertation contains three essays. The first essay deals with the political economy of contracting out with the private sector in the US transit industry. A model of bus contracting is developed to assess whether contracting out, as an alternative institutional arrangement, is feasible given the political economy of the US transit industry. The essay finds that significant constraints exist that hinder a more extensive use of contracting out in the US transit industry. The second essay deals with public transport organization in developing countries. It develops a model of public transport organization by examining the cost structures of the scheduled service and the informal transport providers. The implication of the model for bus franchising is developed and tested using Jamaica's experience with bus franchising. Finally, the third essay uses the same theoretical framework employed in the first and second essays to develop a model of the organization of corruption in developing countries, and to construct a hypothesis on how corruption is different in Asia than in Africa.