THE EISENHOWER AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS' DECISIONMAKING ON VIETNAMESE INTERVENTION: A STUDY OF CONTRASTS

This study is a comparative analysis of the most critical portion of two decisionmaking processes, both of which could have led to American intervention in Vietnam. The Eisenhower administration's policy making that culminated in the President's decision not to intervene at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 is compared to President Johnson and his administration's policy making that fully committed the United States to an Asian war in 1965. By using the 1954 deliberations as a comparative baseline, it is possible to discern some interesting differences between the two administration's interventionist decisionmaking.;The study is ordered and structured by referring to the decisionmaking process. This analytical framework is subdivided as follows: Policy Formulation, Presidential Decisionmaking Style, and Congressional Legitimation. The decisionmaking role of the two Presidents, their principal advisors in the executive bureaucracy, and the Congress is analyzed using the methodology described in the first chapter. Chapter II is a historical case study of the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations' Vietnam decisionmaking. The comparative analysis of the two administrations begins in Chapter III with bureaucratic policy formulation. Next, the two President's impact on developing their respective policy is explained and contrasted in Chapter IV. Chapter V examines the different role Congress played in 1954 and 1965 in shaping interventionist policy. The final chapter summarizes the study's findings.;In addition to an array of secondary sources, the study makes extensive use of the Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam and other government documentation. Particularly useful is the recently declassified Top Secret memorandum, "Report on Survey of the Military Situation in Vietnam," submitted by Army Chief of Staff, Harold K. Johnson to President Johnson directly preceding the United States commitment to a massive military intervention in Vietnam.;The analysis does not support a non-interventionist posture for the United States based on serverely constrained capabilities nor does it advocate an interventionist policy that makes military objectives the primary goal. The study does, however, conclude with a number of important implications for decisionmakers confronted with possible interventionary situations.;These contrasts are used to validate the thesis that compared to the Eisenhower administration's decisionmaking on Vietnamese intervention, the Johnson administration's decisionmaking was critically defective. The corollary propositions are: (1) In 1954 divergence and dissent in the interagency policy formulation process was more effective in assessing the costs and benefits of an interventionist policy than the contrasting interagency convergence and consensus that characterized the formulation process in 1965. (2) President Eisenhower's policy-making style had a more constructive effect on the formulation of Vietnamese policy than did President Johnson's. (The comparison of a number of leadership traits that relate to interventionist policy supports this conclusion). (3) Greater Congressional involvement in interventionary decisionmaking in 1954 potentially permitted the legitimation of a more pragmatically formulated and less restrained interventionist policy than was instituted in 1965. (Having accepted a full partnership role with Congress in 1954, the Eisenhower administration could have used the level of force necessary.) The Johnson administration's interventionist decisionmaking was restricted because of self-imposed limits designed to avoid Congressional dissension.