| The concept of the "correlation of forces" is of cardinal importance for both the Soviet analysis of international relations and Soviet foreign policy. While some non-Soviet scholars have recognized its importance for Soviet analysis, they have overlooked its full meaning and operational dimension. This study approaches the concept from the context of what the Soviets term "interimperialist," i.e. West European-U.S., relations from 1955-73. It examines the meaning and methodology of analysis of Soviet doctrine, in particular the "correlation of interimperialist (i.e. West European-U.S.) forces," both economic and political, and concludes, inter alia, with an assessment of the correlation between Soviet analysis and policy.;In the process of assessing the Soviet analysis of interimperialist relations and Soviet policy toward West Europe, I have arrived at several more general conclusions, including: (1) international economic relations comprise a central part of the Soviet analysis of international relations and therefore of Soviet policy; (2) while western theory generally explains Soviet policy in terms of bureaucratic, organizational, and other factors, positing above all "conflict" within the Soviet polity, this study confirms that Soviet analysis and policy were characterized by an overall consensus.;This study confirms the hypothesis of a direct correlation between the Soviet analysis of the interimperialist correlation of forces and Soviet policy toward West Europe from 1955-73. According to the (Soviet) analysis, as West Europe's economic might--measured in industrial production, exports, currency reserves, and export of capital--grew more rapidly than that of the U.S., the preconditions were established for the attendant fortification of West Europe's political power, which enabled it to break loose from the grip of U.S. economic and political domination and freed it to pursue detente with the Soviet Union. Soviet policymakers, cognizant of the changes taking place within the "interimperialist" relationship, seized the opportunity, and, through initiatives and concessions, set out in turn to construct an enduring detente with West Europe. |
