| In this thesis, the writer will examine the salient legal and political issues arising from the practice of international creditors in using compliance with the terms of the IMF stand-by arrangement as a parallel condition under their loan agreements with a debtor state.;Three main arguments have been considered: Firstly, the assumption that compliance with the terms of the IMF stand-by arrangement constitutes an international obligation is not in accord with the law and practice of the IMF. Any inference of breach entailing state responsibility, therefore, is unwarranted.;Secondly, a debtor state experiencing extreme economic hardship may be justified under international law to take unilateral action having the effect of deviating from the stand-by arrangement provisions.;Finally, it will be argued that the political sustainability of economic adjustment for debtor states through the stand-by arrangements could be enhanced by incorporating human rights principles as a juridical standard for adjustment policies formulated in consultation with the IMF. (Abstract shortened by UMI.). |