Structural and normative sources of ethnic conflict: Status, size, and normative rules for power allocation

The thesis presents some theoretical arguments and two empirical investigations concerning the normative bases of conflict between ethno-cultural majorities and minorities differing in status. The arguments were derived from an analysis of thirteen real-world conflicts between ethno-cultural groups within contemporary states. This analysis suggested the existence of various patterns of ethno-cultural conflict, which were defined in terms of the kinds of demands made by low power groups, the patterns of violence they advocated, and the kinds of reactions to these demands by groups in power. The specific hypotheses derived from the comparative analysis predict that power allocation between ethno-cultural groups is governed by ideologically based normative rules. When these rules are violated to a group's disadvantage, members of this group are likely to perceive power differentials as illegitimate, to make demands for change, and to support the use of political violence as a means to achieve group demands. The hypotheses were tested in two experimental simulations, in which subjects were placed in a hypothetical situation where each played the role of a member of one of two ethnic groups in a particular country. Overall, the results revealed that power is allocated according to normative rules and that the violation of these rules lead to the perception of existing power differences as illegitimate and to advocacy of demands for change. Normative violations are not sufficient to produce support for the use of political violence; but when negotiations are blocked by the other group, support for the use of political violence to achieve group demands increases. The major implication is that inequalities in power lead to conflict over power only when they constitute normative violations.