National human rights institutions: Adoption, design, and effectiveness

Does adopting a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) makes states' international commitments more constraining? If so, why would states adopt the constraining institution in the first place? When states do adopt an NHRI, how do they design it? I answer these three questions in three separate essays in the dissertation. Past scholarship emphasizes the role of domestic institutions for international human rights commitments. NHRIs, domestic institutions tasked with the protection and promotion of human rights, represent another institution to explore. Focusing on the generally secretive practice of torture, I argue NHRIs provide information to potential mobilizers and domestic legal systems increasing the probability states follow through on their commitment not to torture. I find that when a country already ratified the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the presence of an NHRI substantively decreases the chances the state tortures often. Given NHRI ability to constrain state behavior, why do states adopt NHRIs? Most NHRI adoption happens within a norms cascade. I argue states weigh the reputational benefits with the costs of NHRI adoption. Shaming by other actors approximately signals how those actors perceive the state in question's status with respect to the international society of states. Those states never or always shamed do not reap high enough benefits to adopt; more adoption exists in the middle. I test the hypothesis with a Cox Proportional Hazards model and find support that states adopt NHRIs to manage their international status. Not all NHRIs are created equally, though. Considerable variation exists pertaining to what actions NHRIs can legally take to affect their charge; some even levy punishment. The final essay proposes a theory of legislature delegation to NHRIs with the executive seeking to influence the process to retain maximum discretion in the future. Electoral laws and political situations allow the executive to leverage her power with respect to the legislature in order to decrease the probability the NHRI may levy punishment. The executive may even hijack the whole process and create the NHRI unilaterally through decree also decreasing the probability legal NHRI punishment powers. Estimating a Bayesian logistic regression, that accounts for selection and uncertainty, I find support for the theory.