ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGAL STUDY OF THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

This study's thesis is that U.S. practice of economic boycott and embargo encompasses the basic characteristics of economic coercion that, despite its effective employment and high intensity, has generated more controversies with third-party countries than success in achieving its objectives. Thus, the study is directed at the following objectives: (1) establishing the relationship between the Cold War and American use of trade controls as a non-violent weapon to further its foreign policy objectives; (2) examining U.S. instruments of economic coercion: the strategic exports embargo, the denial of MFN tariff treatment, and the direct embargo on imports from and exports to certain Communist countries; (3) untangling the intricate legislation of the U.S. sanctioning mechanism as well as evaluating the juridical, political, and economic issues stemming from it; (4) articulating relevant criteria in international law; and (5) examining the key assumptions of the study, including (a) if sufficient economic pressure is exerted upon the target state, then a change in the behavior of that state can be induced or compelled; and (b) if the primacy of politics over economics is as applicable to today's international society as it is to national societies, then no international legal order envisioned for regulating economic coercion will be able to surmount the political order conditioning it.; Chapter I deals with the general setting of the practice of economic sanctions, including definitions and historical examples. Chapter II untangles the system of trade control laws governing U.S. economic sanctions. Chapter III discusses the application of such laws to American economic boycott and embargo policy. The extra-territorial aspects of this policy and their implications for third-party countries are examined in Chapter IV. Chapter V deals with the application of international law to the American practice of economic sanctions.; The findings of this study are presented in Chapter VI. In brief, the economic leverage enjoyed by the U.S. over Communist countries is becoming progressively more insignificant, negatively reflecting the limited usefulness of economic coercion in achieving its foreign policy objectives. With few exceptions, U.S. practice of economic sanctions can generally be adjudged legal under international law.