| This dissertation presents a critical, philosophical evaluation of the theories and moral assumptions underlying several mainstream approaches to secular ethical instruction. In the Introduction, the observation is made that moral educators are presently faced with a great deal of confusion and controversy when trying to (a) define the moral domain, (b) establish the proper aims of moral instruction, (c) determine how various approaches to moral and values education are alike or different, and (d) decide whether or not contemporary approaches to ethical instruction are morally relativistic, indoctrinatory, anti-religious, anti-authoritarian, and harmful psychologically. This work deals directly with all of these problems.;Reference is made to distinctions found in the Matrix in arguing that no one approach to ethical instruction covers all areas of moral experience, though some programs leave us with the impression that they do. The major thesis is presented that current programs of moral/values instruction presuppose partial and inadequate conceptions of morality which, in effect, tend to distort the real nature of morality, understood in its broadest sense.;Support for the major thesis is offered in Chapters Four through Seven where the Moral Matrix is used to evaluate critically Clive Beck's Reflective Ultimate Life Goals' Approach to Values Education, Lawrence Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moralization, Values Clarification, and John Eisenberg's Canadian Public Issues Approach. In discussing each program, past criticisms of ethical instruction are evaluated.;In the concluding chapter, programs are compared and contrasted. The argument is presented that inadequacies and limitations of previous programs cannot be compensated for by simply combining them as their underlying philosophical assumptions are incompatible. Finally, recommendations for future ethical instruction are offered for preliminary examination.;In Chapter Two, a theoretical framework of moral experience is articulated. The moral domain is defined in terms of six criteria (e.g., subject-object relations and normative considerations). In Chapter Three, the moral domain, as defined, is subdivided into four areas or modes. These modes are differentiated in terms of private and public morality and positive and negative morality. The various modes are assembled together into a theoretical construct called the "Moral Matrix". |
