CALIFORNIA-NEVADA INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT--A STUDY IN CONTROVERSY

The subject of this case study was the legislative consideration of the California-Nevada Interstate Water Compact in the California and Nevada legislatures during 1969 to 1971. The Compact was introduced into the California and Nevada legislatures in 1969 after fourteen years of negotiations between California and Nevada. The intent of the agreement was to allocate the waters of the Truckee, Carson, and Walker Rivers to California and Nevada. Complicating the division of these waters between the two states was the question of what waters Pyramid Lake, a part of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Reservation, was legally entitled to. The Paiutes opposed the Compact on the grounds that it would discriminate against their water rights, leading to the further decline and ultimate destruction of Pyramid Lake. The plight of Pyramid Lake and the possible infringement on Indian water rights resulted in spirited legislative battles in the California and the Nevada legislatures.;Group theory was used as the conceptual framework for the analysis of the case study. Seven hypotheses consistent with group theory and applicable to the study were presented and tested. The first hypothesis postulates that the primary actors making demands and seeking outputs from the legislatures are groups and their representatives. The second and third hypotheses deal with the legislators' roles: the leaders in bargaining and mediating the interest group conflict in the legislature are relatively disinterested parties on the policy issue being contested; and most legislators are disinterested in a particular policy area and the group conflict on that issue and will take some cues from cue-giving legislators. The last four hypotheses are concerned with the effect that changes in the scope of a political conflict have on the nature and outcome of that conflict; there is a general tendency by participants in the interest group conflict to enlarge the conflict, bringing in new participants and changing the bias of conflict; conditions encountered by interest groups will tend to enlarge or limit the scope of the conflict; interest groups will use the tactic of trying to enlarge or limit the scope of the conflict to their advantage; and as the scope of the interest group conflict changes to include different political arenas, interest groups will find different conditions and policy questions in a different context. The analysis of the data presented in the case study supported each of these hypotheses.