A modern great power concert: New York, Tokyo, London and the political economy of transnational financial regulatory cooperation. (Volumes I and II)

From 1986 to 1993, against a backdrop of large-scale transformation of global financial markets, dramatic changes occurred in the way banks are regulated internationally. States undertook major commitments to regulate their financial sectors according to collectively accepted standards. While many scholars of the political economy of international trade voiced concern over growing protectionism and discord in a multipolar world no longer dominated by a free trade-oriented "hegemon," international cooperation was actually on the rise in the sphere of finance. This new cooperation was all the more striking because it took place outside of international organizations with formal charters and had no legal or constitutional basis. The cooperative arrangements were non-binding, informal, and ad hoc. Multipolarity did not appear to hinder cooperation, and formal institutions did not seem to encourage it.; This thesis asks what conditions impel the emergence of new regulatory cooperation in international finance. It argues that the non-institutional pattern of cooperative behavior among major financial powers can be identified as a "concert," and in developing this concept, examines what fundamental conditions allowed the emergence of cooperation. It also examines whether "concert" as an analytic category could be of use not only in the study of financial regulatory cooperation, but in the field of international political economy as a whole. The concert model provides a theoretical starting point from which to evaluate the prospect of alternating state leadership in a multipolar world--a situation in which Japan as a newly-evolved superpower might play a key role.; The study examines two of the most important international regulatory initiatives in finance in recent years: The Basle Accord on capital adequacy (1986-1993), and the Statement of Principles on consolidated supervision (1991-1993) arising out of the scandal concerning the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. Both cases involved the "Basle Committee on Banking Supervision" of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle, Switzerland.; The analysis of these cases indicates that three historical forces drove the emergence of a regulatory "concert" of major powers in international finance: shocks from evolving financial markets, changes in the global distribution of financial capabilities, and the interactive process of great power negotiation in the financial sphere.