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Research On The Optimal Production Decision Of The New Energy Vehicle

Posted on:2021-04-25Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:N LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2480306107479054Subject:Applied Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,Chinese government has adopted a series of policies to promote the development of the new energy vehicle industry.In this development stage,consumers’ awareness and acceptance of new energy vehicles has increased,and the market penetration of that has also been promted.The new energy vehicle’s reasonable production pricing strategy is an important guarantee for its marketization,as a newly developed industry emerging with government support.new energy vehicles.Therefore,this paper focuses on the issue of new energy vehicles production decision-making of auto companies as the government’s subsidies exit the market.Therefore,this paper focuses on the issue of new energy vehicles and traditional vehicles production decisionmaking of auto manufacturers as the government’s production subsidies exits the market.This article aims at maximizing the profit of the vehicle manufacturers.Based on the comprehensive consideration of the influence of consumers’ purchase intention on the manufacturer’s production behaviors,the utility functions of the consumers and vehicle manufacturers are established.Firstly,this paper analyzes the production strategies of vehicle manufacturing under different market structures.Then,further analyze the impact of consumer’s payment premium for new energy vehicle preference on the optimal pricing strategies and optimal profit of the manufacturers under different market structures.Then,numerical analysis is used to verify related conclusions.Finally,the new energy vehicle market share,optimal profit and environmental impact under different market structures are compared and analyzed.The following conclusions are mainly as follows:In the monopoly market,using the Lagrangian method to solve the constrained vehicle enterprise’s optimization model,the results is showed as follows:(1)this paper gives the optimal production strategy for the manufacturers which simultaneously produce conventional vehicles and new energy vehicles under all possible consumer’s premium levels.The optimal pr oduction proportion of new energy vehicle increase with consumer’s premium paid.(2)As the premium rises to the relevant higher level,the market share of the vehicle manufacturer will decline,and eventually drop to 1/2 of the market capacity.(3)There is a U-shaped relationship between the optimal profit of the manufacturer and consumer’s premium.Manufacturer’s profits first fall and then rise with respect to consumer’s premium.In the duopoly market,by solving the stackelberg game model,the results is showed as follows:(1)this study gives the optimal production strategies of both the traditional vehicle manufacturer and the new energy vehicle manufacturer under different consumer’s premium.(2)The market share of new energy vehicles will increase as the payment premium increases.When the payment premium reaches a certain level,the market is in a state of coexistence of conventional vehicles and new energy vehicles.(3)Under the duopoly market structure,the optimal profit of the new energy vehicle manufacturer increases with respect to the payment premium.However,the optimal profit of traditional manufacturers vary with different consumer’s premium levels.By comparing manufacturers’ production strategies,consumer market conditions and environmental impacts of different market structures,the study found that choosing to produce new energy vehicles will become the optimal production strategy for the manufacturers with new energy vehicle manufacturing capabilities under the two types of market structures,when premium paid by consumers reaches a certain threshold.The difference is that the manufacturers have different payment premium conditions for entering the new energy vehicle market.Under both market structures,when the level of consumer’s premium is in the relevant low range,the market share of the new energy vehicle will increase as consumer’s premium increases.From the perspective of environmental impact,the total environmental impacts of both the monopoly market and the duopoly market decreases with respect to consumer’s premium.When consumer’s premium reaches to a certain level,the environmental impact of the monopoly market is less than that of the duopoly market.According to the above conclusions,it is found that promoting the entry of specialized new energy vehicle manufacturers into the vehicle market is conducive to reducing the market threshold for consumers to buy new energy vehicles.Encouraging the traditional vehicle manufacturer to produce new energy vehicles can effectively reduce the market shares of traditional vehicles in the market.These will effectively accelerate the speed of new energy vehicle market penetration,and reduce the environmental impact of the total vehicle market.The results in this study expand relevant research on new energy vehicle production decisions,and reveal the inherent relationship between consumer behavior and manufacturer’s new energy vehicle production decisions and profits.Besides,the results can give some implications for promoting the healthy development of the new energy vehicle industry,new energy vehicle manufacturer’s production strategies,and effectively providing theoretical guidance and quantitative method references for government policy-making.
Keywords/Search Tags:New Energy Vehicles, Consumer’s Premium, Stackelberg Game, Production Decision
PDF Full Text Request
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